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From Maoist to Mujahid

The Kashmir Monitor





By Nadeem F. Paracha

From the 1990s onwards, quite a few analysts began to explain the Islamic extremist outfits operating out of Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province and the tribal areas that border it, as a post-Cold-War expression of Pashtun nationalism. Even though religion has always played an important role in the make-up of Pashtun identity, Pashtun nationalism was always a more secular phenomenon.

station was molded by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (aka Bacha Khan) and then expressed through outfits such as the Khudai Khidmatgars, the National Awami Party (NAP), the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP) and most recently, by the Awami National Party (ANP).


However, ever since the 1980s, Pashtun identity (at least in popular imagination) has been gradually mutating to mean something that is fanatical. Detractors of this image point out three factors which have transformed the notion of Pashtun nationalism. Sana Haroon in Afghanistan’s Islam wrote that during the Khilafat Movement in India (1919-1924), a group of clerics and ulema engaged Pashtun tribes and preached them armed jihad against the British. They were told by the clerics that the Pashtuns’s ‘legendary bravery’ and passionate love for Islam alone could topple the ‘infidel’ British.

Pashtun tribes were once again in the picture when they made up the bulk of Pakistan’s ‘irregular forces’ which participated in the first Pakistan-India war in 1948. In his October 23, 2014 essay on the subject, K. Barmazid writes that the tribesmen were gathered by one Khan Khushdil Khan, a local leader from the Mardan area. He asked the tribesmen to prepare themselves for ‘jihad.’

When Pakistan became an active participant in the United States’ proxy war against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, General Zia-ul-Haq’s dictatorship — to whip up support for the Afghan Mujahideen — used state media and anti-Soviet intelligentsia to proliferate the idea that historically the Pashtuns were an unbeatable ‘race’ that had defeated all the ;infidel’ forces who had attempted to conquer them.

In the last decade or so – especially ever since extremist violence gripped Pakistan, and with KP and the tribal areas becoming the epicenters of this violence – various Pashtun parties, groups and individuals have been aggressively using political, social and cultural platforms to challenge the perception that religious extremism found in certain Pashtun-dominated militant outfits has anything to do with Pashtun culture or nationalism.

But how many of us know that most of the rugged areas which, before the military’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb (2014-2017), had become bases of extremist outfits in KP and its surrounding areas, were once bastions of militant Maoist groups?

NAP described itself as a socialist-democratic party working towards achieving democratic reforms and greater autonomy for the country’s non-Punjabi populations and provinces. When the 1956 Constitution promised to hold Pakistan’s first ever direct election based on adult franchise, NAP was poised to bag the most seats in West Pakistan as well as in the Bengali-majority East Pakistan.

However, the promised elections never took place. Field Marshal Ayub Khan imposed Martial Law through a military coup in 1958 and banned all political parties. NAP leaders were released from jail when in 1962 Ayub lifted the ban on political parties and authored a new constitution. But during the 1965 Presidential election, cracks began to appear in NAP.

Due to the growing hostility between the time’s two communist powers, Soviet Union and China, various leftist parties of the world began experiencing splits. When the Ayub regime’s foreign policy began to tilt a bit towards communist China, NAP leader Maulana Bhashani, a pro-China figurehead, insisted that NAP support Ayub.

On the surface NAP remained to be a united front. But beneath the veneer its leaders had begun to disagree among themselves on the question of supporting Ayub. When Ayub set out to compete with Fatima Jinnah in the 1965 Presidential election, the Bhasahni lobby of NAP supported him whereas the Wali Khan faction opposed him.

In 1966, when the 1965 Pakistan-India war ended in a stalemate, Ayub’s young Foreign Minister, Z A. Bhutto (the initial architect of Pak-China relations), resigned, accusing Ayub of ‘losing the war on the negotiating table.’

According to Philip E. Jones in Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, Bhutto tried finding a position for himself in NAP. But since NAP was packed with veteran leftist and ethno-nationalist figureheads, Bhutto decided to form his own socialist party, the PPP. By then the split in NAP had become apparent.

The pro-Soviet faction (led by Bacha Khan’s son, Wali Khan) suggested working to put Pakistan on a democratic path and then achieve the party’s goals of provincial autonomy and socialist economy. The pro-China faction led by Bhashani disagreed and rejected democracy. Bhashani instead advocated that the party work with peasant groups to initiate revolutionary land reforms. The pro-Soviet NAP became NAP-Wali while the pro-China faction became NAP-Bhashani.

It was NAP-Wali that became the bigger faction because whereas the pro-Soviet student and trade unions attached themselves to the Wali faction, most Maoist groups – instead of backing the Bhashani faction – decided to attach themselves to Bhutto’s PPP. But soon a third faction in NAP appeared. A more radical faction from within NAP-Wali broke away in 1968 and decided to adopt the Maoist strategy of achieving a socialist revolution through an armed struggle carried out by peasant militias.

Thus was born the Mazdoor Kissan Party (MKP) that held its first convention in Peshawar in 1968. MKP refused to take part in the 1970 election. Inspired by the Maoist ‘Naxalite’ guerrilla movement in India and Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’ in China, MKP activists, led by former NAP leader and Pashtun Maoist, Afzal Bangash, travelled to Hashtnagar in KP’s Charsadah District and began to arm and organize the peasants against the local landlords.

As the area of influence of MKP’s struggle grew, another communist, Major (Rtd.) Ishaq Mohammad, joined MKP with his men. Unlike Bangash and most MKP cadres, Ishaq and his men were not from the KP. They were from the Punjab. Both men led MKP to spread its influence across various rural and semi-rural areas of KP and gained the support of the area’s peasants as well as some tribal elders.

In a 2009 essay in the Sarhad Journal, Niaz Muhammad and A Askar wrote that MKP’s guerrilla activities continued to grow and gather support. MKP managed to ‘liberate’ some lands by ousting the landlords. The outfit with its force of Pashtun peasants were rapidly gaining ground when, after a Civil War in East Pakistan, the region broke away and became Bangladesh in 1971.

Bhutto and his PPP came to power whereas NAP-Wali came to head coalition provincial governments in KP and Balochistan. Relations between the pro-Soviet Pashtun nationalist and chief of NAP-Wali, Wali Khan, and the pro-China Bhutto, were anything but cordial. Historian Ishtiaq Ahmed suggests that in a secret meeting between the MKP leadership and Bhutto, the latter assured that his government would not take action against MKP guerrillas in KP that was now under the rule of the NAP-Wali coalition government (The Friday Times, October, 2015).

MKP increased its attacks on landlords and the police in rural and semi-rural areas of KP. MKP then dispatched Major Ishaq to generate a similar movement and struggle in the poverty-stricken rural areas of South Punjab. But since the Punjab in those days was the electoral bastion of the PPP, the Bhutto regime came down hard on the MKP.

With Bhutto distracted by the police action against MKP in South Punjab; labour unrest in Karachi; and intelligence reports that the NAP-Wali government in Balochistan was helping arm Baloch nationalists, the NAP-JUI coalition government in KP unleashed a brutal crackdown against the MKP in KP.

Heavy fighting between mercenary militias formed by landlords (and backed by the police) and MKP guerrillas erupted in Charsadah and surrounding areas, as the KP government attempted to retake the land that the MKP fighters and the Pashtun peasants had brought under their control. About 200 sq. miles of land was under MKP’s control when the KPK government began to send waves of armed policemen against the guerrillas.

MKP accused NAP-Wali of using Pashtun nationalism and the JUI of exploiting Islam to protect the economic interests of the landlords. NAP-Wali and JUI accused MKP of becoming a tool in the hands of the Bhutto regime to stir up trouble in KP. The MKP movement was finally crushed in 1974, not by the NAP-JUI government as such, but by the Bhutto regime.

In 1973 Bhutto had dismissed the Balochistan government, accusing it of fostering separatist Baloch tendencies. The KP government resigned in protest, giving Bhutto the opportunity to install his own men in the two provinces. He then moved in against MKP in KP. This triggered an intense debate within the MKP. One section urged that since MKP had gathered the support of Pashtun peasantry, it should join electoral politics. Those opposing the idea suggested that there was no room for ‘bourgeois democracy’ in Maoism.

Major Ishaq, however, had already begun to see MKP as a militant expression of Pashtun nationalism. In 1976 he broke away from the party, returned to Punjab and formed his own faction of the MKP. The Bhutto regime arrested and jailed NAP-Wali’s Pashtun and Baloch leadership. He then influenced the courts to ban NAP.

By the time the Bhutto regime was toppled in a right-wing military coup by General Zia-ul-Haq (July 1977), MKP’s influence in the KP was already receding. As Zia ended the military operation in Balochistan and allowed the Baloch insurgency’s main components to leave the country, he then moved to neutralize Pashtun nationalism.

Taking advantage of NAP’s withering status and the banned party’s anti-Bhutto sentiments, and also of MKP’s factionaisation, Zia used the opportunity of using Saudi and US funds (that began to pour in after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979), to set-up recruitment and indoctrination centres and madrassas in KP to prepare fighters for the ‘anti-Soviet Afghan jihad.’

Afghan jihadists (Mujahideen) were given aid and space in the KP. A lesser known fact is that some of the first Pakistani fighters who were inducted into the ‘jihad’ where those tribal Pashtuns who were radicalised by the MKP through Maoist literature and lectures the early 1970s. In 1979, their radicalism was reoriented by the Pakistani state to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Trained by the MKP and bred on the sayings of Mao and Marx, these fighters were promised American Dollars and Saudi Riyals, and then indoctrinated in the ways of jihad. Over the years, these early Pakistani Pashtun fighters who fought in Afghanistan would take the memories of their Maoist past with them, and would eventually be replaced by Pashtuns with little or no memory of such a past at all.

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Pulwama: In the Aftermath

The Kashmir Monitor



By Imran Yawer

The Pulwama terror attack which claimed the lives of more than 40 CRPF troops was the deadliest to have occurred in Kashmir in terms of casualties. The Pakistan-based militant group, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) or Army of Mohammed, claimed responsibility for the attack while Adil Ahmed, a young man from Pulwama who joined JEM in 2018, was identified as the perpetrator. This brutal attack has ratcheted up the already tense relations between India and Pakistan, leading many to wonder what the cross-border implications of the attack will be on the two countries.

Interestingly enough, even before the forensic evaluation of the scene of the crime was completed, the Indian Government embarked on a diplomatic and economic offensive against Pakistan. The Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi was summoned to the Indian Foreign Office for a strongly worded demarche. Concomitantly, the ambassadors of foreign countries were briefed on the attack and on Pakistan’s purported role by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. New Delhi also revoked Pakistan’s MFN status and pledged to launch an all-out effort to isolate Pakistan, an effort that has already been initiated by the Finance Minister, Arun Jaitley, who on February 16, 2019, declared that custom duties on all imports from Pakistan would be raised to 200 percent. India is further expected to seek Pakistan’s blacklisting in the upcoming FATF meeting, and according to reports, Indian agencies are already busy with preparing a dossier to establish Pakistan’s culpability in the recent Pulwama attack.


Pakistan’s response to these allegations by India has been an outright rejection of any involvement in the attack. The Foreign Office released a statement expressly condemning such ‘acts of violence anywhere in the world’ and dismissed all such inferences made ‘by elements in the Indian media and government that sought to link the attack to Pakistan without investigations.’

Insurgency in Kashmir, which once was attributed to links across the border has morphed into a homegrown movement for liberation, at the vanguard of which are the new generation of Kashmiri youth; educated and enlightened. These young liberators are challenging the military might of the Indian establishment and their struggle is garnering popular support from within, which has had a dispiriting effect on the Indian security forces, who despite overwhelming presence in the region have not been able to weaken the will of the Kashmiris.

The surge in violence in Kashmir is rooted in decades of violence, repression and discrimination against the Kashmiri people. According to the UN, the ‘excessive use of force, unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests, sexual violence, detention of families and children, as well as enforced disappearances’ is tantamount to a gross and consistent violation of human rights. All evidence suggests that by resorting to hardline policies in Kashmir, India has failed to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Kashmiri people. Against such a backdrop, pointing a finger at Pakistan for bloodshed and violence in Kashmir is both vile and risible. The Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, who was elected in 2014, had vowed to undertake a hard line policy in its dealings with Pakistan and to crackdown on the separatist movement in Kashmir.

As such, the Modi Administration, like its predecessors has been unable to recognise discontent and disenfranchisement among the Kashmiris against Indian policies, and their disproportionate use of force, in a trend that will continue unless India brings sanity and rationality in its Kashmir policy. With general elections in India only a few months away, the Indian Prime Minister would need to project an image of tough leadership in regard to national security matters. As the situation currently stands, he is already under pressure from hard line groups for a decisive retaliation against Pakistan, much in the pattern of the ‘surgical strikes’ India claimed to have carried out against Pakistan, following the 2016 attack on an Indian army base in which 19 soldiers were killed; claims that have been denied by Pakistan.

Meanwhile, according to media reports from February 15, 2019, the US National Security Adviser, John Bolton, assured his Indian counterpart, Ajit Doval of US’ cooperation “to work together to ensure that Pakistan ceased to be a safe haven for JEM and terrorist groups that targeted India, the US and others in the region.” It was further reported that in a telephone call, Bolton had assured Doval of US’ support for India’s right “to defend itself against cross-border attacks.” On February 16, 2019, Modi stated that the “country understood the anger simmering within the soldiers,” and gave free reign to the military to respond to acts of violence in kind.

Pakistan’s response to these allegations by India has been an outright rejection of any involvement in the attack. The Foreign Office released a statement expressly condemning such ‘acts of violence anywhere in the world’ and dismissed all such inferences made ‘by elements in the Indian media and government that sought to link the attack to Pakistan without investigations

Although, JEM has been classified a proscribed organization in Pakistan, India claims that the group and its leader, Masood Azhar, were openly active in Pakistan, raising money, recruiting, and training. India has further attributed several similar terrorist activities to the group, including a 2001, raid on its parliament in New Delhi, and demands that Pakistan should take ‘immediate and verifiable action’ to stop the activities of these militants. In response, Pakistan has vehemently rejected these insinuations as ‘part of New Delhi’s known rhetoric and tactics” to divert global attention from their human rights violations. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister has called for an end to such ‘tit for tat’ accusations, in favour of the resumption of dialogue. In fact, since assuming office, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, has repeatedly focused on dialogue with the promise to take two steps forward for every one step taken by India, in order to forge friendly ties; an effort that has been stonewalled by the Modi administration on grounds that India saw no constructive approach from Pakistan.

The terrorist attack in Pulwama has been rightly condemned by the international community, including Pakistan. At the same time, there has also been a growing realization that the reinvigoration of insurgency in Kashmir is home based and home grown, in popular reaction to India’s ‘muscular policies’ in the form of atrocities by Indian security forces on helpless protestors. The option for peace in Kashmir is only achievable if India desists from pursuing its hardline policies against hapless Kashmiris and if it works in tandem with Pakistan to find a solution that brings harmony to a region that has long been plagued by instability and conflict.

The old practices of blaming and intimidation have proven ineffective for India in the past, suggesting the need for an alternative strategy that does not rest on the need for one-upping the other but on collective efforts geared towards sustainable peace in the region.

For its part, Pakistan also needs to exercise greater insight and control on the clandestine activities of non-state actors that operate from within the country to malign the State with their unacceptable actions. Just days before the Pulwama attack, Jaish ul-Adl, a Salafi jihadist terrorist organization based in the Sistan and Baluchistan Province of Iran, carried out a car bomb attack against Iranian revolutionary guards, killing 27 of them. The brutality of the attack by an organization that has allegedly sought shelter in Pakistan, prompted the Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, to warn that ‘unless Pakistan did more to crack down on Jaish al-Adl, Iran would take action it deemed appropriate’.

While the State of Pakistan or its agencies may not be involved in carrying out or supporting activities detrimental to peace and stability in the region, the buck does not stop there. We need to get up from our languorous slumber and exercise greater vigilance. The evolutionary trends in terrorism have already outwitted even the most resourceful countries. In South Asia, its burgeoning existence is a painful reality. ‘No country in the world has suffered more than Pakistan from the scourge of terrorism, often perpetrated from outside’. Today, Iran seethes with anger, India grits its teeth and the world is looking for foot prints in Pakistan, in such times, we should not be found cuddling the neighbour’s sheep.

(Daily Times, Lahore)

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Pulwama Reveals Limits to Muscular Policies

The Kashmir Monitor



By M.K.Bhadrakumar

The fedayeen attack in Pulwama, Jammu & Kashmir, on Thursday killing 44 paramilitary personnel and injuring scores of others should be properly understood.
At the most obvious level, the country is paying a very heavy price for the Modi government’s Kashmir policies — riveted on relentless state suppression of an alienated people — and its muscular, one-dimensional approach toward Pakistan — giving a ‘free hand’ to the security establishment to pay back in the same coin.

The Modi government’s hardline policy has proved not only futile but may increasingly become counterproductive. Indeed, the crisis in J&K has deepened in the past 3-4 years while the security tsars don’t even have a back channel to Pakistan anymore.


In all probability, the Jaish-e-Mohammed led by Masood Azhar continues to enjoy the patronage of Pakistani security establishment. But Islamabad has swiftly responded that “We strongly reject any insinuation by elements in the Indian media and government that seek to link the attack to Pakistan without investigations.”

But the bottom line is that the massacre in Pulwama could have been foretold. Pakistan’s internal security situation has significantly improved and cross-border terrorism from Afghanistan has tapered off. This creates a sense of triumphalism and an ‘itch’ to settle scores, as it were.

Nonetheless, one striking thing must be noted — the timing. The campaign for the 2019 parliamentary poll is gathering momentum. To be sure, the attack casts the government and PM Modi in very poor light.

Our ruling elite is hard-pressed to be seen reacting strongly and decisively. The dilemma is palpable. On the one hand, disconnect between the authorities and the people of J&K is almost unbridgeable today. On the other hand, any ratcheting up of tensions with Pakistan is inextricably linked to regional security and stability.

Significantly, the crisis has erupted just four days before the next round of talks between the US and the Taliban in Islamabad on February 18 and the final hearing on the case of Kulbhushan Jadhav, an alleged R&AW operative, at the International Court of Justice at the Hague on the same day. Is it a mere coincidence?

The Pakistani PM Imran Khan is personally mediating between the US officials and Taliban leadership. To be sure, what is unfolding will be of momentous consequence for President Trump personally, whose decision to bring the ‘endless war’ in Afghanistan to an end is directly related to his own bid for re-election in 2020.

Fundamentally, though, the Pulwama attack has been directed at the paramilitary forces — not the Indian Army. It aimed to hit our security tsars below the belt and expose them as inept and vacuous people.

The ICJ hearing on February 18 provides the backdrop to the Pulwama attack. At the Hague, India is having to defend itself against the Pakistani allegations of cross-border terrorism. Pakistan will leave no stone unturned to level charges that India has been undertaking covert operations to destabilise it. There seems to be a message in all this for the Indian security establishment.

Of course, in the final analysis, the buck stops at Modi’s desk. The sensible thing should have been to follow up the BJP’s tie-up with PDP to form a coalition government in Srinagar with political initiatives to create synergy for a peace process in the Valley.

Similarly, nothing would have been lost by engaging Pakistan in talks. Good statecraft dictates that a country engages its adversaries on core issues of differences and disputes instead of resorting to meaningless theatrics to impress the uninformed public gallery.

Arguably, conditions were propitious to open a new page in our relations with Pakistan. The election of Imran Khan and the overture made by him (as well as army chief Qamar Bajwa) did open a window of opportunity.

But our security establishment, with its entrenched zero sum mindset, preferred to quibble and look for alibis not to engage with Imran Khan — that he is a mere rubber stamp of the military, that he hobnobs with Islamist groups, that he is a bird of passage and so on. Modi could have — and should have — asserted.

At the end of the day, the conclusion becomes unavoidable that an India-Pakistan moratorium on muscle-flexing is badly needed. This ancient ruckus must be laid to rest — and the shenanigans that go on below the radar must be ended conclusively. It involves statecraft to rein in hawks from crowding the skies. Of course, the easy thing to do is always to whip up jingoism.

With the Afghan power calculus shifting, a new beginning is possible. There is food for thought that Masood Azhar, who has a chequered past leading all the way to Kandahar, has surged in the Valley after an absence of 20 years.

And the Pulwama attack took place just 4 days before serious talks are beginning in Islamabad, finally, to rehabilitate the Taliban as a mainstream political force and India will be defending its own reputation at the Hague. We must read the tea leaves correctly.

Meanwhile, in political terms, in the face of the infinite tragedy in Pulwama, the government must make the effort to evolve a consensus opinion in the country to address the crisis in J&K, which is undeniably the root cause of terrorism.

But that may be too much to expect from the Modi government, whose focus is on vilifying political opponents and harassing them, or systematically polarising the national opinion.


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Punitive action must begin at home

The Kashmir Monitor



By Sanjiv Krishan Sood

The deaths of more than 40 Central Reserve Police Force personnel in an attack by a suicide bomber in South Kashmir on February 14 has led to shrill calls for retribution against Pakistan by self-proclaimed defence experts on social media, panelists on TV news channels and the anchors moderating these sessions. Since the attack – the second-most deadly strike in the history of the Central Reserve Police Force – senior government functionaries have also been mechanically trotting out statements, as they always do, promising that the sacrifice of India’s jawans will not be in vain.

But if any action needs to be taken, it must first start in India. There is absolutely no doubt that the political leadership and policy makers in New Delhi, and police and security officials on the ground – all of whom allowed this massive tragedy to happen under their watch – are guilty of criminal negligence.


What is worse is that they refuse to learn from previous mistakes, allowing such tragic losses of life to recur with alarming regularity. Those responsible for the huge failure of intelligence that led to the Pulwama tragedy must therefore be sacked for their incompetence. This will be a lesson to all.

There are several failures that contributed to the success of the suicide attack on the Central Reserve Police Force convoy in Kashmir.

First, why did the government allow such a large body of troops – nearly 2,500 men – to travel together in a large convoy of 80 vehicles? The troops were stranded in Jammu for two days prior to this because bad weather had led to the closure of the National Highway. But once the weather improved, instead of transporting all of them via road, they should have been airlifted into the Valley.

This is typical of the disconnect between decision makers in Delhi and troops on the ground. What kind of leaders are those who do not act proactively to alleviate the hardships of the specialised paramilitary forces they command? I believe these leaders are not up to the task entrusted to them and must be sacked.

The second failure is that of intelligence. A wireless signal dated February 8 is being touted as proof that intelligence received about a possible improvised explosive device blast had been shared with the Central Reserve Police Force. But that was a general signal addressed to everyone in the Valley to be cautious against such a blast. This cannot be called “intelligence”. Perhaps intelligence agencies could do a better job by being more specific. Unfortunately, such agencies have started treating basic information as intelligence. They appear to have forgotten the art of collating and analysing information received from different sources.

Intelligence agencies have a few questions to answer. For one, the assembly of such a large quantity of explosives and the purchase or requisition of the vehicle that became the moving bomb would have taken some time, and have also left some footprints for intelligence personnel to identify. Why were these not spotted? Similarly, there would have been contact between the suicide bomber and his handler. Why were these not intercepted?

The third failure if that of operational negligence, which is related to training. Before any armed forces personnel convoy proceeds in the Valley, a road opening party or ROP, which leads the convoy, sanitises the route. The job of this team is to ensure that the road is clear of any threats, including from small arms fire.
It is not clear whether the car used by the suicide bomber came from the same direction of the convoy or the opposite direction. Either way, the road opening party failed in its task. If the car was travelling in the direction of the convoy, how was it allowed to overtake several vehicles of the convoy and ram into one of them? Reports also suggested that the explosives-laden vehicle was stationary on the road for a few minutes before the convoy reached the spot where the attack took place. If that was the case, how did that not attract any suspicion from the road opening party?

Additionally, news reports quoted an Inspector General of the Central Reserve Police Force who suggested that the explosion was accompanied by firing. If true, this is an even bigger failure on the part of the road opening party. This implies that the troops did not dominate the road effectively. It also speaks poorly of the officer supervising the road opening party. Had he been doing his job properly, he would have ensured that his team was alert, ensuring that there would have been a chance – however remote – of preventing the tragedy.

All this reflects poorly on the training of the troops deployed with the road opening party. This brings us to the matter of training of troops, a growing cause of concern. It is a fact that training of the central paramilitary forces has suffered over the years. Continuous deployment of troops, absence of any reserves – including training companies – and a large intake of troops around 2013-2014 to fill vacancies as well as to aid expansion has played havoc with training systems. But that is not all. The attitude of Indian Police Service officers who lead the force ­– who do not assign any priority to training – is also to blame.

When I served with the Border Security Force, I recall that the post of Inspector General (Training) – responsible for formulating training policies for troops – was used mainly as a parking slot for officers on the verge of retirement or wanting a posting to Delhi for personal reasons. Merit was rarely a consideration for filling up this important post. It is possible that the same attitude plagues the training position in the Central Reserve Police Force.

The fourth failure is that of the Centre’s Kashmir policy. Prime Minister Narendra Modi said on Friday that security forces had been given a free hand to punish those responsible for the attack. The question is: why did it take this massive tragedy for him to realise the seriousness of the situation in Kashmir? It is well known that South Kashmir is the hotbed of militancy. Then, what prevented security forces from operating proactively there? Even if one might concede that the previous government in Jammu and Kashmir was somewhat sympathetic to militants, the state has been governed by the Centre since the government collapsed in June. What has then prevented the government from operating proactively?

In the aftermath of the Pulwama attack, several voices – official and unofficial – blamed Pakistan for the tragedy. The narrative is that militants carried out this operation in “despair”. This is an immature understanding of the situation. While the role of Pakistan in fomenting trouble in Kashmir is beyond a doubt, it cannot be said that it is the only reason. Pakistan is exploiting the weaknesses of India’s Kashmir policy to the hilt. This is why New Delhi needs to urgently address its policies on Kashmir.

Additionally, militants do not operate out of despair. They operate whenever they find that security forces have let down their guard. They attack security forces at their weakest point after meticulous planning and preparation. This is why security forces in Kashmir cannot afford to let their guard down even for a moment. It is for their commanders to ensure this through adequate training and continuous supervision.

Finally, the fifth failure is the attitude of India towards its paramilitary soldiers. They are treated as second-class soldiers and are poorly paid and under equipped as compared to their counterparts in the Army. They are even deprived of pension of the kind Army personnel are entitled to. The lack of proper equipment such as bulletproof vehicles and jackets also seriously compromises their efficiency and morale. All this must change.


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