The making of the Kargil disaster

By Nasim Zehra

On May 17, 1999, the prime minister was given a detailed operational briefing on Operation KohPaima (Op KP). It was held at the Inter Services Intelligence’s (ISI’s) Ojhri Camp office, only a few miles away from Islamabad, against the backdrop of Indian press reports claiming that Mujahideen under fire cover provided by Pakistani soldiers had infiltrated along the Line of Control (LoC)…
The Director General Military Operations (DGMO) Lt Gen Tauqir Zia gave the detailed presentation. The entire Kargil clique, including the army chief Gen Pervez Musharraf, the Chief of General Staff Lt Gen Aziz Khan, Commander 10 Corps Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed, and Commander Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) Brigadier Javed Hassan, was present. Key men from ISI in attendance included the DG ISI Lt Gen Ziauddin Butt, director analysis wing Major Gen Shahid Aziz, and ISI’s point man for Afghanistan and Kashmir Maj Gen JamshedGulzar, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, accompanied by the Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, the Finance Minister, the Minister for Northern Areas and Kashmir Affairs Lt Gen (r) Majeed Malik, the Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad, and his principal secretary Saeed Mehdi.
DGMO Zia began the presentation with the words: “Sir, as per your desire we have made a plan to upgrade the freedom movement in Kashmir.” It would be a five-phased operation and the first phase had been completed, he explained. He then proceeded to show, on the map, scores of positions that had already been taken. However, military maps without any text were used for the briefing. Nothing was written and they only had symbols on them. Normally, even military men receiving briefings on such maps, with only symbols, first require orientation to understand what these maps represent. For example, the LoC was not clearly demarcated on the map. Hence, during the presentation, when Pakistani and Indian positions were pointed out to the prime minister, he was unable to fully comprehend the locations of these posts. Instead, for him, the main focus of the briefing were the achievements of the Pakistani troops. There was no mention of Pakistani troops crossing the LoC, nor of the Pakistani troop build-up five to 10 kilometres beyond the LoC. One of the retired generals recalled, “I saw scores of positions across the LoC in the IOK [Indian Occupied Kashmir] area.”
Indian Kashmir is spread over three areas: the Jammu sector, PirPanjal Range to the [Kashmir] valley, and the Leh and Ladakh sector. The entry from Jammu to the valley is through the Manihaal Pass and from Leh and Ladakh the entry is through the Zojila Pass. The DGMO explained that, in phase two, “We will infiltrate freedom fighters into Leh and Ladakh, who will start the insurgency in the area.” In phase three, the general predicted that, when pressure was applied on the Indian forces from the flanking sectors through the operations of these infiltrating groups, the Indians would start bringing their troops to Ladakh and Jammu, leaving the valley virtually drained of troops. In phase four, the DGMO explained, Pakistan would rush in large numbers of freedom fighters into the valley and block the Manihaal and Zojila passes, thereby isolating the valley and occupying the area. The general predicted that in phase five, the final phase, the Indians would be on their knees begging for talks and Pakistan could dictate its own terms.
The DGMO proceeded to share the four assumptions which, according to its planners, guaranteed the success of the five-­phase Op KP. First, each post being held was impregnable. Second, the Indians did not have the will or the determination to take on Pakistan in a fight and would not make any serious effort to regain the heights. Third, as far as the international context was concerned, Pakistan need not worry because there would be no external pressure. Fourth, that the army recognised the economic crunch faced by the country and therefore the government would not be asked for any extra resources for operation; the army would use its own sources to fulfil the financial requirements.
The main thrust of the presentation was to inform the elected leadership of the army’s “achievements” along and across the LoC. The impression given was that the strategic heights lay somewhere in the un-demarcated zones. The DGMO informed the participants that Pakistan’s troops had occupied strategic heights that Indians would now find almost impossible to reoccupy. The army chief emphasised the irreversibility factor and said that, based on the wisdom and experience of his entire professional career, he could “guarantee the success of the operation.”
The thrust of the briefing was to inform the civilian participants that, because of the operation, the tempo of “jihad” would increase, that only the Mujahideen were conducting the operations and Pakistan was only providing logistical support, and that militarily the peaks taken by the Mujahideen were impregnable. The architects of KohPaima were confident that India would first “create noise, then respond militarily, but the fighting to follow would be restricted to the operation’s area. Finally, India would be quiet, the participants were told, and tell its public that it had retaken the peaks. This flawed assumption by the KohPaima architects was, in fact, a wishful extrapolation from what had mostly been Pakistan’s own response pattern to major Indian incursions across the LoC. Especially after India launched a major operation in 1984 to occupy the Siachen glacier, Pakistan under the military ruler Gen ZiaulHaq had remained mum. No response from India, the architects concluded, would provide Pakistan with bargaining chips over Kashmir.
Flattery was in abundance. The CGS piled on more, “Sir, you will go down in the history of Pakistan as the PM in whose tenure Kashmir was resolved.”
Clearly, the masterminds of Kargil were not seeking permission for the operation they had already launched. The prime minister was presented with a fait accompli. With the cover of Op KP having been nearly blown and diplomatic pressure imminent, the Kargil clique was seeking political and diplomatic cover for the operation. The prime minister was pointedly asked if he and his team could politically and diplomatically leverage their ‘unassailable’ military achievements to promote and project the Kashmir cause.
Following the DGMO, the CGS Lt. Gen. Aziz Khan rose to flatter the prime minister. “Sir, Pakistan was created with the efforts of the Quaid and the Muslim League and they will always be remembered for creating Pakistan and now Allah has given you the opportunity and the chance to get India-held Kashmir and your name will be written in golden letters,” he declared. CGS Aziz also invoked the PM’s Kashmiri descent and lured him with the possibility that “after Quaid, it is a unique opportunity to be remembered as the FatahiKashmir.”
The ISI’s point man for Afghanistan and Kashmir, Lt. Gen Gulzar, also gave a presentation on the Mujahideen. Gulzar recounted the limitations of the Mujahideen, their inability to inflict heavy damage on the Indian Army, capable only of ‘softening’ the environment for the Pakistan Army to move in, but also pointed out that the Mujahideen were not present in the area of the operation. However, the only route available for the movement of Indian weapons, troops and supplies in the Srinagar and Leh area was where the Mujahideen could lay ambushes, attack isolated military posts, blow up bridges and culverts.
Steadfast in their dedication to their institutional ethos, all the men in uniform raised no questions at the presentation. As would later transpire, the top commanders in the ISI were all sceptical of, if not totally opposed to, Op KP. Lt. Gen. Gulzar would subsequently criticise the operation as a “blunder of Himalayan proportions,” born of a temptation that every Commander 10 Corps would face upon finding an “open space.” Emphasising the point, the general would later recall, “When I took over the command of 10 Corps, I had to put my troops on a leash because they would say we can move forward since we are on a height.”
Similarly, years later, the then head of the ISI’s analysis wing Maj Gen Shahid Aziz would write, “An unsound military plan based on invalid assumptions, launched with little preparation and in total disregard to the regional and international environment, was bound to fail. That may well have been the reason for its secrecy. It was a total disaster.”
There was a divided response from the civilian participants. The DGMO pointedly asked Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad if the Kargil situation could be utilised to “feed into our effort to project Kashmir.” The general was keen to know if diplomatic advantage could be derived from this military operation. Noncommittally, the Foreign Secretary indicated that it might be possible. Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, however, expressed his reservations on two counts: one, that it was incongruent with the spirit of the Lahore summit [held in February the same year] and, two, that the US would not support the operation.
Sartaj Aziz pointedly asked his PM whether the plan the army had made was not contrary to the undertaking in the Lahore Declaration. “Sartaj Aziz Sahib, can we ever take Kashmir through paperwork? We have here an opportunity to take Kashmir,” was a relaxed Nawaz Sharif’s response. By contrast, his foreign minister was perturbed. He was clear that this operation would not help Pakistan get international support for Kashmir.
The other obviously perturbed man in the room was Sharif’s minister for Kashmir and Northern Areas, Majeed Malik. A retired general, Malik grilled the Commander 10 Corps about the logistics for the forward troops. He interrogated how the supplies would reach the troops under “adverse weather conditions and in a hostile environment.” He recalled the hazardous terrain he had personally visited. Lt Gen Mahmud’s curt response was that times had changed, that “our troops are fully covered.” The retired general also asked the DGMO, “What if the Indians do not remove their troops from the valley and instead induct air power in the conflict theatre?” Meanwhile, the silent worrier in the room, Sharif’s defence secretary, also a retired general, opted to not raise any questions. At the conclusion of the formal meeting, he merely whispered to other military officers, “The foreign office will never be able to handle this.”
The prime minister only sought his cabinet members’ opinion regarding the operation; he asked no tough questions himself. Based on whatever he understood regarding the operation, and factoring in the reservations expressed by his ministers, the elected prime minister opted to go along with the fait accompli presented to him by the military. He wanted a resolution of the Kashmir issue and appeared convinced that Op KP would advance that objective. He was perhaps also swayed by the upbeat tone of the DGMO’s ‘victoryalltheway’ presentation and partly by the notion that he was well on his way to becoming the man “whose name will go down in history in golden words as the man who liberated Kashmir.” The prime minister took well to the words of the CGS that for the PM “after the Quaid it is a unique opportunity to be remembered as the FatahiKashmir.”
Flattery was in abundance. The CGS piled on more, “Sir, you will go down in the history of Pakistan as the PM in whose tenure Kashmir was resolved.” In response to this, Nawaz responded, “But then you didn’t tell me when you will fly the flag of Pakistan in Srinagar.” Civilians present registered this as a comment made in jest. Meanwhile, flattery plus the army chief’s claim that, based on the wisdom and experience of his entire professional life, he could “guarantee the success of the operation,” had won Nawaz Sharif’s support for Op KP.
The prime minister had not factored in the clearly stated reservations of his foreign minister and minister for Kashmir and Northern Areas. He was assured of no military reverses, and he chose to believe his military commanders. Interestingly, at no point during the meeting was there any exchange between the PM and the military men signalling Sharif’s prior knowledge of the operation. There was only a passing reference made in the DGMO’s opening comments to the PM’s March approval given at the ISI-convened meeting to “upgrade the freedom movement in Kashmir.”
The most vocal critic, however, was the secretary of defence. The retired general spoke for about 20 minutes, warning that Op KP would either end in all-out war or a total military disaster for Pakistan. … Implying that the army command had launched Op KP without clearance from the government, the defence secretary emphasised that the army was not an independent body and had to take orders from the government.
As the meeting drew to a close, the CGS proposed a joint prayer for the success of Op KP. The prime minister asked him to lead the joint prayer. With this, the meeting concluded. Most present at the meeting, including those who subsequently became the harshest critics of the operation, believed it would be a success.
Immediately after the meeting, the defense secretary, Lt. Gen (r) Iftikhar Ali Khan, followed the prime minister in his car. It was about 9pm and Sharif was entering the lift in the Prime Minister’s House when Iftikhar, hurriedly following him, said, “Sir, can I talk to you? It is important.” The nation’s chief executive asked him if he could wait till the next morning. The defence secretary persisted. He said he wanted to ask two questions. One: Did the military leadership get his permission to cross the LoC? The prime minister asked him whether the army had actually crossed the LoC. “Didn’t you note all that about ‘hundreds of posts’ and that NLI troops, not freedom fighters, have crossed the LoC?”
Gen Iftikhar continued asking his second question: “Crossing the LoC, Mian Sahib, you know has implications for war?” Late at night, the rather surprised prime minister said, “Why a war? And who has crossed the LoC?” He was told that about five to six hundred square kilometres of Indian territory and hundreds of posts had been occupied. The prime minister instructed the defence secretary to explain the situation to his minister the next morning.
(Excerpts from well known Pakistan writer and columinist, NasimZehra’s book, ‘From KargilTo The Coup: Events That Shook Pakistan’. Courtesy: The Dawn)
(To Be Concluded)