By Isobel Ingham-Barrow
In September last year, Zaynab Hussein, a Muslim mother from Leicester, was taking her children to school when Paul Moore ran over her with his car. Moore then proceeded to hit an eight-year-old girl in a hijab, before returning to the scene where Zaynab lay injured on the floor and running over her again.
Meanwhile, Islamophobic hate crimes recorded by the Metropolitan Police Force in London have risen from 1,115 in 2015/16, to 1,665 in 2017/18 – an increase of roughly 50% in just two years.
Examples such as these are overt symptoms of Islamophobia in our society. However, there are also symptoms that are much harder to detect:
– the CV that is passed over because it boasts a Muslim sounding name;
– or the British-Pakistani man who is repeatedly assumed a threat at the airport on the basis of his beard;
– or the child who feels unable to ask questions in class because she is worried she may be swept up into the apparatus of PREVENT.
Taking all these different examples into account, the APPG (All-Party Parliamentary Group) for British Muslims recently launched an inquiry into a working definition of Islamophobia. In line with that inquiry, Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND) released their report “More than Words: Approaching a definition of Islamophobia” in an event in Parliament today. With contributions from leading academics and experts in their fields (such as Tariq Modood, Nazir Afzal, Todd Green, Lasse Thomassen, Aaron Winter, and Aurlien Mondon, to name but a few), the report is not intended to force a specific definition onto the APPG. However, it is important in its exploration of the roots and causes of Islamophobia, how and why it is fuelled, and its socio-political and personal consequences.
Islamophobia remains a contested term amongst political and academic debates. Some deny Islamophobia exists at all, and others resist attempts to define it for fear that it would be elevated to such a position that it cannot be ignored. However, a definition is important because it provides much-needed clarity in legislation that is intended to protect vulnerable minorities.
Once established, terms such as sexism, homophobia, racism and anti-Semitism became important tools to oppose and tackle the various discriminations and prejudices these labels embody.
It is now time to afford official recognition to a definition of Islamophobia.
While a full working definition can be found in the report itself, MEND’s definition of Islamophobia can be split into two parts:
The overt part: Islamophobia is a prejudice, aversion, hostility, or hatred towards Muslims.
The “hidden” part that affects all Muslims both as individuals and as collective groups: that is the discrimination that excludes or limits Muslims’ equal exercise of fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
According to MEND, the reasoning behind this definition is to secure Islamophobia, not just as hate crime and abuse, but also for it to be recognised in the ways that it works to exclude Muslims from all realms of civic life, whether that be through workplace discrimination, or through institutional Islamophobias that discourage Muslim voices from participating in democratic debates.
For some time, there has been considerable debate as to whether the term “Islamophobia” is appropriate, accurate or even counterproductive. This has led individuals and organisations to propose the use of other terms such as “anti-Muslim hatred”. However, MEND, along with the Runnymede Trust and various other experts in the field, argue unequivocally that the term “Islamophobia” is the most appropriate terminology.
Firstly, Islamophobia is a term that holds currency within public discourse and is well established within popular understanding. Many victims of Islamophobia may not have the technical vocabulary to fully explain their experiences. However, the long-standing existence and usage of “Islamophobia” means that the term has meaning for those whom it affects. Ultimately, if you want to help victims, you have to engage in a way that is meaningful for them. Therefore, “Islamophobia” is not a term that will be easily replaced within political, activist or victim vocabularies.
Secondly, differences between terms such as Islamophobia and “anti-Muslim hatred” reflect differences in focus and understanding of the phenomenon. Therefore, they produce different approaches and priorities in tackling it. If you don’t fully understand the problem, you are not going to solve it.
For example, while “anti-Muslim hatred” may be used to describe hate crime, verbal abuse, and harassment, it hides the damaging effects of anti-Muslim agendas within politics and media and, therefore ignores the dangers of discrimination and socio-political exclusion. In other words, “anti-Muslim hatred” covers the first part of MEND’s definition (hatred and hostility) but not the second part (discrimination and exclusion).
On the other hand, “Islamophobia” provides a broad understanding that explicitly identifies the phenomenon in all its forms and which, therefore, provides a useful tool in finding strategies for tackling it.
One of the main accusations against the word “Islamophobia” is that it is an attempt to stifle free speech and all criticism of religion. However, it has never historically, nor should it presently, be seen in this light. MEND’s report goes to great pains to highlight this point.
Islamophobia should not be understood as a protection against questioning or criticising religion. Nor should it be seen as an attempt to enforce restrictions on freedom of speech.
However, there is no absolute right to freedom of speech when it can harm others and society has always done what is necessary to protect individuals from abuse and violence. Indeed, under the Racial and Religious Hate Crime Act, 2006, Jews and Sikhs are protected against insulting, abusive of threatening words and behaviour. Therefore, including Islamophobia into this framework does not result in limiting freedom of speech further than what already has existing legal precedents.
The prospect of developing an official working definition of Islamophobia is hugely important in the challenge to tackling the hostilities, hatred, discrimination and exclusions that British Muslims face on a daily basis. Meanwhile, work such as MEND’s report highlights the importance of understanding all the different forms that Islamophobia takes and the mechanisms that drive it. It is only if we truly understand Islamophobia that we can effectively tackle it.
‘Stunk in my nostrils’.
By Hindol Sengupta
Gandhi and Nehru both advised Bose not to contest again [for Congress presidentship in 1939]. Patel and Gandhi tried hard to convince [AbulKalam] Azad to take on the role but he refused. Gandhi then proposed the name of a relatively minor Congress leader, PattabhiSitaramayya, and top leaders of the Congress Working Committee, including Patel and Prasad, supported Sitaramayya. If only Patel had contested with Gandhi’s blessings, there was a fair chance that Bose would have withdrawn but now he faced a man who was no match for him, but one who had Gandhi’s blessings and the support of the top Congress leaders. By choosing to contest, Bose was also shattering recent Congress protocol of having presidents elected unopposed to show unanimous choice and avoid intra-party disputes, at least overtly, on presidentship. He wrote to the Congress leader:
“If the Right-wing really want national unity and solidarity, they would be well advised to accept a Leftist as president. They have created considerable misapprehension by their insistence on a Rightist candidate at any cost and by the unseemly manner with which they have set up such a candidate who was retiring and who had been surprised that this name had been suggested for presidentship.”
Countered the Sardar: “For me, as for those with whom I have been able to discuss the question, the matter is not one of persons and principles, nor of Leftists and Rightists. The sole consideration is what is in the best interest of the country.”
Netaji’s charisma was enough to beat the charmless Sitaramayya. Congress delegates spurned Gandhi and Patel’s appeals and voted for Bose. The Bengali leader won the second time by 205 votes.
Gandhi had been defeated, as had the all-powerful party boss Patel. Gandhi, of course, would not take his defeat lying down, and he did the only thing that could have turned the tide against Bose. He made the defeat about him, and not about Sitaramayya. “The defeat is more mine than his,” Gandhi declared in a letter, and left it to Bose to “choose a homogenous cabinet and enforce his programme without let or hindrance…after all SubhasBabu is not an enemy of his country.”
The subtext was immediately clear. It was a threat. Gandhi was telling the Congress to choose again – this time between him and Bose. By telling them that Bose was not the enemy of the country, Gandhi was ascertaining that the Congress leaders understood that Bose was an enemy, but of the Congress as envisaged by Gandhi.
Even though the party had ignored Gandhi’s advice, the Congress was not ready to break away from Gandhi. And any middle ground between Gandhi–Patel and Bose had long since disappeared. The young Bengali leader was too aggressive – in fact, too reflective of the mood of the country.
At the Tripuri session of the Congress, where Bose’s older brother Sarat represented him because Netaji was ill, a majority of the Congress Working Committee resigned.
GovindBallabh Pant proposed a new resolution demanding a different Working Committee that was approved and guided by Mahatma Gandhi. “The die was cast. All the subsequent attempts made at compromise were a cry in the wilderness.”
To weaken Bose’s position, Gandhi even issued a public statement advocating “unconditional cooperation with Britain in the prosecution of the war”. Bose, as president, demanded a mass civil disobedience, instead, against the British Raj.
After Tripuri, a furious Sarat Bose wrote to Gandhi:
“What I saw and heard at Tripuri during the seven days I was there, was an eye opener to me. The exhibition of truth and non-violence that I saw in persons whom the public look upon as your disciples [targeting Nehru, Patel, Azad and company] and representatives has to use your own words, ‘stunk in my nostrils’. The election of Subhas was not a defeat for yourself, but of the high command of which Sardar Patel is the shining light.”
Sarat Bose uses the harshest words for Subhas’ opponents in this and the choicest abuses are directed towards Patel.
‘The propaganda that was carried on by them against the Rashtrapati [president, i.e. Subhas] and those who happen to share his political views was thoroughly mean, malicious and indicative and utterly devoid of even the semblance of truth and non-violence.’
Sarat Bose accused Gandhi’s closest acolytes of having shown none of the Gandhian sense of fairness.
At Tripuri, those who swear by you in public offered nothing but obstruction and for gaining their end, took the fullest and meanest advantage of Subhas’s illness. Some ex members of the Working Committee went to the length of carrying on an insidious and incessant propaganda that the Rashtrapati’s illness was a ‘fake’, and was only a political illness.
An anguished Patel responded:
“It pains me to find that he could use such language and attribute such personal motive and charges against his colleagues with whom he happened to differ in politics and thereby bring down the entire Congress politics to the lowest possible level where difference of principles or policy have no place whatever. It would be easy to answer the letter in the same strain but it would be of no advantage to anybody to imitate the tone and temper of the letter which is evidently written more in anger than in reason. After all what answer one can give to such a passionate and abusive denunciation?”
In the end, it became impossible for Bose to lead a Congress that was full of leaders who were determined to frustrate his programme. No matter how much support he could garner from ordinary, especially younger, followers and members of the party, the machinery of the Congress was against him. Even though he had won the election fair and square, he could not find a path of compromise with Gandhi. Bose resigned.
Fear: Trump in the White House
By Rachel Carnell
Bob Woodward’s new book, seems to contain scant new information.
Like Michael Wolff’s Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House, it portrays President Donald Trump as an “emotionally overwrought, mercurial and unpredictable leader” whose senior staff struggle to contain his most dangerous impulses.
This same view of Trump was reiterated in a September 5 anonymous op-ed in The New York Times which, as Nebraska Senator Ben Sasse observed, is “just so similar to what so many of us hear from senior people around the White House, you know, three times a week”.
But whether Fear tells us something new matters less than the fact that the book is yet another broadside against Trump’s image. It adds more fuel to the suspicions many have about the president’s behind-the-scenes behaviour.
In fact, Woodward’s Fear – together with Wolff’s Fire and Fury, OmarosaManigault’s Unhinged and the anonymous op-ed – is part of a long tradition of political “secret histories”, a genre that recounts salacious and scandalous details about the dealings, relationships and temperaments of those in power. It is a practice that goes back centuries, and it is one that my co-editor and I explore in our book The Secret History in Literature, 1660-1820.
Secret histories tend to take two forms. There is the plain-spoken, just-the-facts approach, similar to Woodward’s Fear. Then there are novelistic accounts with major figures depicted using pseudonyms, as in Primary Colors, a lightly fictionalised dramatisation of the Clinton White House.
But the secrets unveiled in these works usually do not come out of nowhere. Instead, they contain anecdotes that have long been whispered or suspected. The goal of secret histories is to emphasise embarrassing stories about a ruler or government – to propel the drumbeat of negative coverage in order to strengthen the opposition and, in some instances, to even topple governments.
Justinian was the subject of a secret history circulated by the military historian Procopius. Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons
Secret histories date back at least to the sixth century, when the military historian Procopius wrote down sordid anecdotes about the Byzantine emperor Justinian and his wife Theodora, in a work that became known as Anekdota, which translates to “unpublishable things”. Ten centuries later, it appeared in Latin as Historia Arcana, or “Secret History”.
As a military historian, Procopius had helped create the myth of Justinian’s greatness in his eight-book treatise The Wars of Justinian. But in his Anekdota, Procopius finally told the ugly backstory of Justinian’s reign: his lust, his seizure of others’ property, his petty vengefulness and his persecution of non-Christians. The work was almost certainly circulated in manuscript scroll among Justinian’s enemies. While it probably damaged his standing, Justinian was nonetheless able to retain his grip on power.
After French and English translations of Procopius’ Anekdota appeared in 1669 and 1674, secret histories in the same style began to appear about King Charles II of England.
These tended to focus on his mistresses, particularly the infamous Duchess of Cleveland, who manipulated Charles for over a decade, persuading him to grant her land and money and bestow titles of nobility on their illegitimate children.
These reports, which read like tabloid-style gossip, were never just about sex.
Readers of one account, titled The Amours of the King of Tamaran, likely realised that if the king could be duped and controlled by his powerful mistress, he was also susceptible to being influenced by England’s adversaries.
Indeed, he was: another secret history, Andrew Marvell’s Account of the Growth of Popery and Arbitrary Government in England, described the backstory of the Secret Treaty of Dover, in which Charles II accepted large sums of money from the French king in exchange for promising to return England to Catholicism.
Speculation over King Charles II’s relationship with the Duchess of Cleveland was rampant during his reign. Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons
These publications did not bring down the politically skilled Charles II, who was glad to take Louis XIV’s money but savvy enough to decide against changing his country’s religion.
They did, however, sow suspicion towards Charles II and his family. After Charles II’s death, his openly Catholic younger brother, James, ascended the throne in 1685, instilling fear that England would return to Catholicism. Seven Englishmen wrote to Prince William of Orange – who was a Protestant – pleading that he invade England. In the Glorious Revolution that ensued, James II fled to France, and Parliament declared William and his wife, Mary, joint monarchs of England.
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 helped inspire American colonists to rebel against another British monarch, with the not-so-secret history of George’s III’s “repeated injuries and usurpations” enshrined in the Declaration of Independence.
Some might disparage Woodward’s book as “anonymously-sourced gossip”. But gossip has always been important to humankind. As Israeli historian Yuval Noah Harari notes in Sapiens, his best-selling account of early human history:
“It is not enough for individual men and women to know the whereabouts of lions and bison. It’s much more important for them to know who in their band hates whom, who is sleeping with whom, who is honest, and who is a cheat.”
Those who dismiss Woodward’s book underestimate the power that gossip and behind-the-scenes revelations wield over politics – and the way it has shaped the course of human history.
RSS ‘muscle-flexing’ a bid to re-invent itself?
By Parsa Venkateshwar Rao Jr
There is really no need imagine or interpret the message of the September 17-19 event of the RashtriyaSwayamsevakSangh (RSS) at VigyanBhavan, where by and large only functions related to the government or international organisations are held. The RSS sarsanghchalak, or supremo, MohanraoBhagwat, declared it at the very beginning of his first-day sermon delivered on September 17. He said: “Sanghkosamajh ne keliye is kaaryakramkaaayojanhuahaikyonkisanghabekshaktikeroopmein is deshmeinupasthhithhai” (This programme has been organised to enable people to understand the Sangh because the Sangh today is present as a force in the country). He also said that this was in response to the demand of the RSS’ members in New Delhi who felt that such a meeting should be organised in the national capital to explain the nature and working of the RSS to bigwigs from different walks of life. Neither the RSS nor the media have reported in any detail about who were the people who attended the three-day RSS conclave. The BharatiyaJanata Party is in power at the Centre with a bare majority of its own in the LokSabha, and perhaps the RSS brass must have felt that they would not have an opportunity like this ever again, because the outcome of the 2019 LokSabha election is up in the air. So, in the fourth year of the BJP government, the RSS had decided to have its social outing, though strictly speaking it was a political outing. It is a different matter, though, that the saffron event has turned out to be a flop politically as none of the leaders of the major parties other than the BJP had turned up at the event. And on all the three days, it was a pure Bhagwat monologue.
The media was more than a little bowled over by the open event of the secretive organisation which controls the BJP, though the relations between the political party and the ideological organisation remains as murky as ever. BJP leaders declare their allegiance to the RSS as a badge of courage, and the RSS demurs. But it is known to everyone that the president of the party is nominated by the RSS, and it is not a party affair. The RSS protests that it does not micro-manage the BJP, which is an interesting way of putting it because it leaves enough room for the RSS to manage the BJP anyway. A senior leader of the BJP had confessed that the RSS volunteers had campaigned for the BJP in 2014, and the only other time they did was in the 1977 post-Emergency election.
The RSS still claims that it has nothing to do with politics and its ambition, as stated by its founder BaliramHedgewar, is to train “swayamsevaks”, or volunteers in every village of India, who are trustworthy, virtuous, who do not discriminate and hate anybody. And Bhagwat lets slip in the confession that this was for the rejuvenation of “Hindu” society. In the second lecture, he did not say that the Sangh ideology was different from Hinduism but that “ism” is a closed concept and it does not apply to the Hindu faith. Then he resorts to the usual term of “Sanatan Dharma”. And taking “Hindu” as a geographical and civilisation notation, he argues quite unconvincingly and sheepishly that everyone living in India is a Hindu!
The interesting twist in Bhagwat’s monotonous exposition was that he stuck to Hedgewar and passed in silence over M.S. Golwalkar, the man who took over as RSS chief after Hedgewar died. Bhagwat took care to explain that Hedgewar wanted to prepare citizens who were able to take up the responsibilities of an independent India. Hedgewar was certainly a lower middle class Hindu conservative from the Vidarbha region, who perhaps did not preach the clash between Hindus and Muslims in the militant tone that Golwalkar did. Deleting Golwalkar from the RSS discourse should indeed raise eyebrows. The RSS seems to be learning from the experience of the BJP that you cannot survive in politics by catering only to Hindus. The RSS is now updating itself.
But the devil is in the details. For both the RSS and the BJP, diabolical nationalism is the hammer that they want to use to threaten religious minorities and every other dissident group. Bhagwat could not wriggle out of this dilemma because all he could refer to was to Hindu traditions where atheists had their place as well.
It is tempting to speculate whether there is a simmering tension between the RSS and the BJP, and that the RSS too wants its rightful place in the sun. And it is important to ask whether the RSS volunteers will work for the BJP in 2019 in the same way that they did in 2014. The RSS had officially endorsed the Congress victory in the 2009 LokSabha election, so it should not come as a surprise if the RSS were to entertain second thoughts about Prime Minister NarendraModi’s candidacy. Whatever may be their sibling rivalries, it is inevitable that the RSS and the BJP will hang together. And the truth is that the RSS is not the force in the country that Bhagwat claims it to be. Its strength and importance are overstated both by the partisans and unflinching ideological foes of the RSS. The reason for the growing unimportance of the RSS in India is quite simple. The RSS is not liberal enough to be a cultural organisation, nor does it have the intellectual rigour to be a conservative bastion. It has fashioned itse
lf in the mould of the Boy Scouts, so it cannot but linger at the infra-intellectual level.
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