Indus Water Treaty

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Syed Showkat

Indus Water Treaty was brokered by the World Bank in 1960 after years of negotiations. The treaty divided the six rivers of the Indus system between the two countries. The eastern rivers, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, were allocated for India’s unrestricted use, while the western rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, were allocated primarily to Pakistan, subject to certain uses permitted to India.

The treaty survived multiple tensions, crises, and Pakistan’s terror attacks on India. India regularly warned Pakistan of reconsidering the treaty if it continued to harbour terrorism against India. Despite terrorism backed by Pakistan that killed hundreds of innocents and security personnel in Kashmir and across the rest of the country, after multiple warnings from India, Pakistan did not step back and continued carrying out terror attacks against India. It was April last year when the threshold of patience and compassion was breached, as Pakistan’s terror attack wreaked havoc in the beautiful Baisaran Valley of Kashmir’s Pahalgam, killing around 30 tourists, propelling India to put the treaty in abeyance to pressure Pakistan.

Indus Water Treaty for India is merely an agreement, but for Pakistan it is their agricultural lifeline. It irrigates Pakistan’s lands, is a means of livelihood for lakhs of Pakistani farmers, businessmen, exporters, and the economy, and it provided Pakistan with energy security. It benefitted their economy and lives for years, but the question remains: what Pakistan did with that stability.

India’s position is clear: the Indus Waters Treaty would remain in abeyance until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably ended its support for cross-border terrorism. India says “blood and water cannot flow together”, which is true; you can’t spill blood and ask for water. Pakistan’s dependence on the Indus River system is enormous. Its agriculture, food security, hydropower and wider economy are closely connected to the waters of the Indus basin. Reuters has reported that the treaty is crucial to a large majority of Pakistan’s irrigated agriculture. That dependence should have encouraged Pakistan to maintain stable relations with India and protect every mechanism that ensured predictable water management. Instead, Pakistan repeatedly allowed its soil and money to be used against India.

The irony is difficult to ignore. A country that depends heavily on a river system originating largely outside its territory chose to maintain a hostile relationship with the country controlling the upper reaches of important rivers. Rather than recognising this geographical reality and investing in diplomacy, water efficiency and domestic storage, Pakistan often treated the treaty as an entitlement that could exist independently of the rest of bilateral relations.

Now that Pakistan’s hostile policies and terrorism against India have put its own agricultural security under threat, a rogue Pakistan has put its own people in trouble. A treaty that benefitted countless families across Pakistan now stands in doubt because of its notorious policies. Pakistan is deeply dependent on the Indus River system for agriculture, food production, drinking water, and livelihoods. The World Bank describes the Indus Basin Irrigation System as central to Pakistan’s water and food security, while groundwater linked to the canal system is also crucial for farmers and rural communities. Any prolonged abeyance in water cooperation can increase risks for farmers, crop production, food prices, and rural livelihoods. It can hurt the already ailing economy, force agricultural industries to shut down, lose capital, and hamper Pakistani exports. Indus Water Treaty supports around 80% of Pakistan’s agriculture. Imagine the pain of those families who depend on those lands and crops that are irrigated with IWT.

 Pakistan’s poor storage capacity of under 30 days further jeopardises this vulnerability, making the trouble more painful for poor Pakistanis. Pakistan’s hostile policies have raised questions of food security, energy security, water supply uncertainty, and risk in major crop production. It was reported across major provinces in Pakistan that farmers fear risks in crop production like maize, wheat and rice. Uncertainty in water can increase food prices in Pakistan. Pakistan’s own media and agricultural experts have repeatedly raised this concern. Farmers, agricultural labourers and businesses dependent on farming are particularly vulnerable. If irrigation becomes unreliable, the impact can spread from farmers to transporters, traders, agricultural workers and food businesses, putting indefinite pressure on rural livelihoods. Thus, ordinary Pakistanis end up paying the price for decisions made by political and military leadership. Farmers cannot control foreign policy, workers cannot decide military strategy, and ordinary families cannot determine relations with India, yet they are the ones who could face higher food costs, weaker agricultural incomes, and greater water insecurity.

That is the real meaning of the argument that Pakistan has put its own people in trouble: policies pursued for wicked means can eventually create insecurity for the very population they claim to protect. When political and security decisions repeatedly come at the cost of economic and human security, ordinary citizens are left to bear the consequences. In the end, it is the farmer, worker, and common household that pays the price for decisions made by those in power.

(The author can be reached at vadiekashmir@gmail.com)