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Bhutto message to Yasser Arafat’s message from death cell





I was ten years old when I learnt in school that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was coming to our area, Padidan. There was little else they could talk about at the barber’s shop, where I used to read the newspaper out loud for people every day over a free cup of milky tea.
All I knew is that I had to go see for myself. I asked my father to take me. It is a mile and a half from home, he said. Are you sure you can make it? But I was not to be dissuaded. Take me, I said, and made a counter offer: I won’t ask you for pocket money for a month. He gave in.
In my excitement, I didn’t mind how long the walk was. When we got there I saw a sea of people. I had never seen such a crowd before in my entire ten years of being on this planet. They had come for a campaign rally for the 1970 elections.
The last time I saw Bhutto again was at the train station of my hometown Padidan in 1978 aboard the Khyber Mail when he went to Karachi. The train arrived late because people would lie on the train tracks to stop the train to see him
I had warned you, my father said. I was too small to see the stage so I asked him to take me closer. But when we reached it, I could barely see over it. Then I spotted a big Banyan tree. I dragged my father there and got him to give me a leg up. The view was spectacular. I clung to the trunk and gazed down from the best seat in the house.
That was about 48 years ago. Bhutto’s party won in West Pakistan, the 1971 war that dismembered Pakistan’s Eastern wing. And I remember Bhutto’s speech on my battery-powered radio, the size of an old TV set, on December 20, 1971 after he had assumed power.
The second time I saw him was five years later. I was studying at Government College Nawabshah in 1976. One day, our classes were released early and we were told that Prime Minister Bhutto would address a gathering on campus. Late morning we heard the purring of a helicopter, followed by a mini tornado that hit the dry ground, billowing out a dust storm until the chopper blades came to a full stop.
Bhutto, dressed in a suit with a Mao Tse Tung cap, alighted and walked towards to the dais. Local PPP leader Qazi Mohammad BakhshDhamrah, a short stocky man with a big beard and thick glasses, stood next to him. Bhutto spoke in his typical northern Sindhi accent. He asked Dhamrah, ‘Do you know when the elections will be held?’ Dhamrah shook his head.
‘If DhamrahSaheb doesn’t know, I don’t know either,’ said Bhutto to us. Then he went straight to Lahore and announced early elections.
Even today there are many stories about why ZAB announced early elections. Constitutionally, he was not bound to do so until August 1978 but he held the elections in March 1977. KhawajaZaheer Ahmed, now Special Assistant to the Prime Minister, has a different tale to tell. He narrates a story of June 1976 when ZAB and SardarDawood had a summit meeting in Murree. Khawaja was DC Murree then and was looking after the management of the event.
After the meeting, Bhutto was buoyed by the results of the meeting. He looked overjoyed. Zia-ulHaq, the new Army Chief, had been in office for only three months by then. He came to see Bhutto, says KhawajaZaheer. How was the meeting Prime Minister, Zia asked. Bhutto, in his flamboyant mood, said it was the best thing that could happen to Pakistan. When pressed for details, Bhutto said all major issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan stood settled. The Afghans will recognize the international border; we will lift the ban on the defunct National Awami Party and will hold early elections to allow them to contest.
Khawaja says Zia blanched and asked Bhutto how they could restore NAP when its case was pending in the Supreme Court. Bhutto retorted to ask Zia how many witnesses had been cross-examined in the case. Five, said Zia. With that speed, quipped Bhutto, it will probably take fifty years to conclude the case.
As Zia parted, Bhutto gave him another jolt. By the way, some of our friendly countries have played a role in settling the issue of Kashmir with India peacefully once and for all. In a way that Kashmiris will feel proud of us. As Zia left, we talked to each other and thought, it was the worst blunder of his life to divulge the details to Zia. The preparation for a coup started from that point on, insists KhawajaZaheer.
Despite the coup, respect for Bhutto in the ranks of the army did not die. It was met with a surge in popularity, driving hundreds of thousands of people to greet him after his release from detention and later by LHC judge Samdani proved beyond any doubt that Zia would face tremendous reprisals if Bhutto found his way back to power.
The last time I saw Bhutto again was at the train station of my hometown Padidan in 1978 aboard the Khyber Mail when he went to Karachi. The train arrived late because people would lie on the train tracks to stop the train to see Bhutto. At Padidan station, Bhutto alighted from his parlour, waved and went back. That was the last time, I saw him. The last person
In a recent interview to me, Bhutto’s nephew Tariq Islam described the demeanor of his favourite uncle, who he happened to be the last person to see before the immediate family. In March 1979 he got a message from Bhutto’s elder son Murtaza, asking him to come to London. Murtaza said, says Tariq Islam, please deliver two important messages to my father. One message was from Yasser Arafat and one was from Murtaza himself and Shahnawaz. According to Tariq Islam, Murtaza told him that they couldn’t trust anybody else to deliver the message but him since he was family and very close to ZAB.
Tariq reached Rawalpindi jail on Saturday, March 31, attired in a brand new suit. After a body search, he was taken down a long narrow path to the death cell.
It was 6 by 9 feet cell. There was no furniture in the room, except for a mattress a few inches thick and a Indian WC toilet next to it. Bhutto lay on the dirty mattress. Tariq Islam couldn’t believe this stinky dark small death cell was where the first elected prime minister and Pakistan’s most popular leader was kept.
ZAB had reduced to a skeleton as he was on hunger strike. He pointed at the toilet. They have put it here by my bedside to humiliate me, ZAB told Tariq. ‘I am not eating, so I don’t have to use the damn thing.’
Bhutto then look at Tariq and, as a man of his own sartorial excellence, said he was happy to see him so smartly dressed. He told Tariq Islam exactly where his shirt was from in the UK.
Tariq then delivered both messages to ZAB. The message from Yasser Arafat was that ZAB was precious, not only for Pakistan but for the whole world. Tell Bhutto to cooperate with us so that we can take him out of prison, Arafat had told Murtaza. Bhutto listened to what Tariq Islam was passing on and then said: Please convey my regards to Yasser Arafat and tell him that I don’t want to go down in history for breaking out of jail and escaping to save my skin.
The second message from Murtaza and Shahnawaz was even more alarming. Murtaza Bhutto conveyed that Hafeezullah Amin, the then President of Afghanistan, had invited him and his brother to come to Kabul and set up a guerrilla base to fight the military junta. All Murtaza wanted was permission from his father. According to Tariq Islam, Bhutto was furious to hear this. Tell Murtaza to knock it off, he said. Does he really think that I sent him to Oxford and Harvard to become a guerrilla leader?
Tariq asked ZAB why party leaders such as Mumtaz Bhutto and HafeezPirzada were not launching any movement for his release. Bhutto told him that they had come to him exactly that. Do you think that I am so small and so desperate to beg them for my life, Bhutto went on to say. If they are not leaders worth their salt to put up a fight, why would I ask them to do so?
A lot has been said about the vindictiveness and unforgiving nature of ZAB. ShaukatJaved, a former IG of Punjab, was an SSP in the police when Bhutto was undergoing a trial in the Lahore High Court and later at the Supreme Court in 1978. He narrates a story Bhutto himself told him. When Bhutto came to power, he invited Ayub Khan to President House. Ayub had thrown Bhutto in jail after he broke off with him after the Tashkent pact. Shaukat said Bhutto told him that he came out of his office to receive Ayub on the porch. When Shaukat asked why did that, Bhutto told him that he had served Ayub and regardless of what Ayub did to him in the end, he believed in etiquette. “Insaankeaankhmeinsharamhonichahye,” Bhutto told Shaukat.
Alas, the same dignity and etiquette was not extended by Zia, who owed his position to Bhutto. The only difference is that today nobody remembers Zia. But Bhutto? Nobody can forget him.



Pulwama: In the Aftermath

The Kashmir Monitor



By Imran Yawer

The Pulwama terror attack which claimed the lives of more than 40 CRPF troops was the deadliest to have occurred in Kashmir in terms of casualties. The Pakistan-based militant group, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) or Army of Mohammed, claimed responsibility for the attack while Adil Ahmed, a young man from Pulwama who joined JEM in 2018, was identified as the perpetrator. This brutal attack has ratcheted up the already tense relations between India and Pakistan, leading many to wonder what the cross-border implications of the attack will be on the two countries.

Interestingly enough, even before the forensic evaluation of the scene of the crime was completed, the Indian Government embarked on a diplomatic and economic offensive against Pakistan. The Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi was summoned to the Indian Foreign Office for a strongly worded demarche. Concomitantly, the ambassadors of foreign countries were briefed on the attack and on Pakistan’s purported role by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. New Delhi also revoked Pakistan’s MFN status and pledged to launch an all-out effort to isolate Pakistan, an effort that has already been initiated by the Finance Minister, Arun Jaitley, who on February 16, 2019, declared that custom duties on all imports from Pakistan would be raised to 200 percent. India is further expected to seek Pakistan’s blacklisting in the upcoming FATF meeting, and according to reports, Indian agencies are already busy with preparing a dossier to establish Pakistan’s culpability in the recent Pulwama attack.


Pakistan’s response to these allegations by India has been an outright rejection of any involvement in the attack. The Foreign Office released a statement expressly condemning such ‘acts of violence anywhere in the world’ and dismissed all such inferences made ‘by elements in the Indian media and government that sought to link the attack to Pakistan without investigations.’

Insurgency in Kashmir, which once was attributed to links across the border has morphed into a homegrown movement for liberation, at the vanguard of which are the new generation of Kashmiri youth; educated and enlightened. These young liberators are challenging the military might of the Indian establishment and their struggle is garnering popular support from within, which has had a dispiriting effect on the Indian security forces, who despite overwhelming presence in the region have not been able to weaken the will of the Kashmiris.

The surge in violence in Kashmir is rooted in decades of violence, repression and discrimination against the Kashmiri people. According to the UN, the ‘excessive use of force, unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests, sexual violence, detention of families and children, as well as enforced disappearances’ is tantamount to a gross and consistent violation of human rights. All evidence suggests that by resorting to hardline policies in Kashmir, India has failed to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Kashmiri people. Against such a backdrop, pointing a finger at Pakistan for bloodshed and violence in Kashmir is both vile and risible. The Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, who was elected in 2014, had vowed to undertake a hard line policy in its dealings with Pakistan and to crackdown on the separatist movement in Kashmir.

As such, the Modi Administration, like its predecessors has been unable to recognise discontent and disenfranchisement among the Kashmiris against Indian policies, and their disproportionate use of force, in a trend that will continue unless India brings sanity and rationality in its Kashmir policy. With general elections in India only a few months away, the Indian Prime Minister would need to project an image of tough leadership in regard to national security matters. As the situation currently stands, he is already under pressure from hard line groups for a decisive retaliation against Pakistan, much in the pattern of the ‘surgical strikes’ India claimed to have carried out against Pakistan, following the 2016 attack on an Indian army base in which 19 soldiers were killed; claims that have been denied by Pakistan.

Meanwhile, according to media reports from February 15, 2019, the US National Security Adviser, John Bolton, assured his Indian counterpart, Ajit Doval of US’ cooperation “to work together to ensure that Pakistan ceased to be a safe haven for JEM and terrorist groups that targeted India, the US and others in the region.” It was further reported that in a telephone call, Bolton had assured Doval of US’ support for India’s right “to defend itself against cross-border attacks.” On February 16, 2019, Modi stated that the “country understood the anger simmering within the soldiers,” and gave free reign to the military to respond to acts of violence in kind.

Pakistan’s response to these allegations by India has been an outright rejection of any involvement in the attack. The Foreign Office released a statement expressly condemning such ‘acts of violence anywhere in the world’ and dismissed all such inferences made ‘by elements in the Indian media and government that sought to link the attack to Pakistan without investigations

Although, JEM has been classified a proscribed organization in Pakistan, India claims that the group and its leader, Masood Azhar, were openly active in Pakistan, raising money, recruiting, and training. India has further attributed several similar terrorist activities to the group, including a 2001, raid on its parliament in New Delhi, and demands that Pakistan should take ‘immediate and verifiable action’ to stop the activities of these militants. In response, Pakistan has vehemently rejected these insinuations as ‘part of New Delhi’s known rhetoric and tactics” to divert global attention from their human rights violations. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister has called for an end to such ‘tit for tat’ accusations, in favour of the resumption of dialogue. In fact, since assuming office, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, has repeatedly focused on dialogue with the promise to take two steps forward for every one step taken by India, in order to forge friendly ties; an effort that has been stonewalled by the Modi administration on grounds that India saw no constructive approach from Pakistan.

The terrorist attack in Pulwama has been rightly condemned by the international community, including Pakistan. At the same time, there has also been a growing realization that the reinvigoration of insurgency in Kashmir is home based and home grown, in popular reaction to India’s ‘muscular policies’ in the form of atrocities by Indian security forces on helpless protestors. The option for peace in Kashmir is only achievable if India desists from pursuing its hardline policies against hapless Kashmiris and if it works in tandem with Pakistan to find a solution that brings harmony to a region that has long been plagued by instability and conflict.

The old practices of blaming and intimidation have proven ineffective for India in the past, suggesting the need for an alternative strategy that does not rest on the need for one-upping the other but on collective efforts geared towards sustainable peace in the region.

For its part, Pakistan also needs to exercise greater insight and control on the clandestine activities of non-state actors that operate from within the country to malign the State with their unacceptable actions. Just days before the Pulwama attack, Jaish ul-Adl, a Salafi jihadist terrorist organization based in the Sistan and Baluchistan Province of Iran, carried out a car bomb attack against Iranian revolutionary guards, killing 27 of them. The brutality of the attack by an organization that has allegedly sought shelter in Pakistan, prompted the Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, to warn that ‘unless Pakistan did more to crack down on Jaish al-Adl, Iran would take action it deemed appropriate’.

While the State of Pakistan or its agencies may not be involved in carrying out or supporting activities detrimental to peace and stability in the region, the buck does not stop there. We need to get up from our languorous slumber and exercise greater vigilance. The evolutionary trends in terrorism have already outwitted even the most resourceful countries. In South Asia, its burgeoning existence is a painful reality. ‘No country in the world has suffered more than Pakistan from the scourge of terrorism, often perpetrated from outside’. Today, Iran seethes with anger, India grits its teeth and the world is looking for foot prints in Pakistan, in such times, we should not be found cuddling the neighbour’s sheep.

(Daily Times, Lahore)

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Pulwama Reveals Limits to Muscular Policies

The Kashmir Monitor



By M.K.Bhadrakumar

The fedayeen attack in Pulwama, Jammu & Kashmir, on Thursday killing 44 paramilitary personnel and injuring scores of others should be properly understood.
At the most obvious level, the country is paying a very heavy price for the Modi government’s Kashmir policies — riveted on relentless state suppression of an alienated people — and its muscular, one-dimensional approach toward Pakistan — giving a ‘free hand’ to the security establishment to pay back in the same coin.

The Modi government’s hardline policy has proved not only futile but may increasingly become counterproductive. Indeed, the crisis in J&K has deepened in the past 3-4 years while the security tsars don’t even have a back channel to Pakistan anymore.


In all probability, the Jaish-e-Mohammed led by Masood Azhar continues to enjoy the patronage of Pakistani security establishment. But Islamabad has swiftly responded that “We strongly reject any insinuation by elements in the Indian media and government that seek to link the attack to Pakistan without investigations.”

But the bottom line is that the massacre in Pulwama could have been foretold. Pakistan’s internal security situation has significantly improved and cross-border terrorism from Afghanistan has tapered off. This creates a sense of triumphalism and an ‘itch’ to settle scores, as it were.

Nonetheless, one striking thing must be noted — the timing. The campaign for the 2019 parliamentary poll is gathering momentum. To be sure, the attack casts the government and PM Modi in very poor light.

Our ruling elite is hard-pressed to be seen reacting strongly and decisively. The dilemma is palpable. On the one hand, disconnect between the authorities and the people of J&K is almost unbridgeable today. On the other hand, any ratcheting up of tensions with Pakistan is inextricably linked to regional security and stability.

Significantly, the crisis has erupted just four days before the next round of talks between the US and the Taliban in Islamabad on February 18 and the final hearing on the case of Kulbhushan Jadhav, an alleged R&AW operative, at the International Court of Justice at the Hague on the same day. Is it a mere coincidence?

The Pakistani PM Imran Khan is personally mediating between the US officials and Taliban leadership. To be sure, what is unfolding will be of momentous consequence for President Trump personally, whose decision to bring the ‘endless war’ in Afghanistan to an end is directly related to his own bid for re-election in 2020.

Fundamentally, though, the Pulwama attack has been directed at the paramilitary forces — not the Indian Army. It aimed to hit our security tsars below the belt and expose them as inept and vacuous people.

The ICJ hearing on February 18 provides the backdrop to the Pulwama attack. At the Hague, India is having to defend itself against the Pakistani allegations of cross-border terrorism. Pakistan will leave no stone unturned to level charges that India has been undertaking covert operations to destabilise it. There seems to be a message in all this for the Indian security establishment.

Of course, in the final analysis, the buck stops at Modi’s desk. The sensible thing should have been to follow up the BJP’s tie-up with PDP to form a coalition government in Srinagar with political initiatives to create synergy for a peace process in the Valley.

Similarly, nothing would have been lost by engaging Pakistan in talks. Good statecraft dictates that a country engages its adversaries on core issues of differences and disputes instead of resorting to meaningless theatrics to impress the uninformed public gallery.

Arguably, conditions were propitious to open a new page in our relations with Pakistan. The election of Imran Khan and the overture made by him (as well as army chief Qamar Bajwa) did open a window of opportunity.

But our security establishment, with its entrenched zero sum mindset, preferred to quibble and look for alibis not to engage with Imran Khan — that he is a mere rubber stamp of the military, that he hobnobs with Islamist groups, that he is a bird of passage and so on. Modi could have — and should have — asserted.

At the end of the day, the conclusion becomes unavoidable that an India-Pakistan moratorium on muscle-flexing is badly needed. This ancient ruckus must be laid to rest — and the shenanigans that go on below the radar must be ended conclusively. It involves statecraft to rein in hawks from crowding the skies. Of course, the easy thing to do is always to whip up jingoism.

With the Afghan power calculus shifting, a new beginning is possible. There is food for thought that Masood Azhar, who has a chequered past leading all the way to Kandahar, has surged in the Valley after an absence of 20 years.

And the Pulwama attack took place just 4 days before serious talks are beginning in Islamabad, finally, to rehabilitate the Taliban as a mainstream political force and India will be defending its own reputation at the Hague. We must read the tea leaves correctly.

Meanwhile, in political terms, in the face of the infinite tragedy in Pulwama, the government must make the effort to evolve a consensus opinion in the country to address the crisis in J&K, which is undeniably the root cause of terrorism.

But that may be too much to expect from the Modi government, whose focus is on vilifying political opponents and harassing them, or systematically polarising the national opinion.


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Punitive action must begin at home

The Kashmir Monitor



By Sanjiv Krishan Sood

The deaths of more than 40 Central Reserve Police Force personnel in an attack by a suicide bomber in South Kashmir on February 14 has led to shrill calls for retribution against Pakistan by self-proclaimed defence experts on social media, panelists on TV news channels and the anchors moderating these sessions. Since the attack – the second-most deadly strike in the history of the Central Reserve Police Force – senior government functionaries have also been mechanically trotting out statements, as they always do, promising that the sacrifice of India’s jawans will not be in vain.

But if any action needs to be taken, it must first start in India. There is absolutely no doubt that the political leadership and policy makers in New Delhi, and police and security officials on the ground – all of whom allowed this massive tragedy to happen under their watch – are guilty of criminal negligence.


What is worse is that they refuse to learn from previous mistakes, allowing such tragic losses of life to recur with alarming regularity. Those responsible for the huge failure of intelligence that led to the Pulwama tragedy must therefore be sacked for their incompetence. This will be a lesson to all.

There are several failures that contributed to the success of the suicide attack on the Central Reserve Police Force convoy in Kashmir.

First, why did the government allow such a large body of troops – nearly 2,500 men – to travel together in a large convoy of 80 vehicles? The troops were stranded in Jammu for two days prior to this because bad weather had led to the closure of the National Highway. But once the weather improved, instead of transporting all of them via road, they should have been airlifted into the Valley.

This is typical of the disconnect between decision makers in Delhi and troops on the ground. What kind of leaders are those who do not act proactively to alleviate the hardships of the specialised paramilitary forces they command? I believe these leaders are not up to the task entrusted to them and must be sacked.

The second failure is that of intelligence. A wireless signal dated February 8 is being touted as proof that intelligence received about a possible improvised explosive device blast had been shared with the Central Reserve Police Force. But that was a general signal addressed to everyone in the Valley to be cautious against such a blast. This cannot be called “intelligence”. Perhaps intelligence agencies could do a better job by being more specific. Unfortunately, such agencies have started treating basic information as intelligence. They appear to have forgotten the art of collating and analysing information received from different sources.

Intelligence agencies have a few questions to answer. For one, the assembly of such a large quantity of explosives and the purchase or requisition of the vehicle that became the moving bomb would have taken some time, and have also left some footprints for intelligence personnel to identify. Why were these not spotted? Similarly, there would have been contact between the suicide bomber and his handler. Why were these not intercepted?

The third failure if that of operational negligence, which is related to training. Before any armed forces personnel convoy proceeds in the Valley, a road opening party or ROP, which leads the convoy, sanitises the route. The job of this team is to ensure that the road is clear of any threats, including from small arms fire.
It is not clear whether the car used by the suicide bomber came from the same direction of the convoy or the opposite direction. Either way, the road opening party failed in its task. If the car was travelling in the direction of the convoy, how was it allowed to overtake several vehicles of the convoy and ram into one of them? Reports also suggested that the explosives-laden vehicle was stationary on the road for a few minutes before the convoy reached the spot where the attack took place. If that was the case, how did that not attract any suspicion from the road opening party?

Additionally, news reports quoted an Inspector General of the Central Reserve Police Force who suggested that the explosion was accompanied by firing. If true, this is an even bigger failure on the part of the road opening party. This implies that the troops did not dominate the road effectively. It also speaks poorly of the officer supervising the road opening party. Had he been doing his job properly, he would have ensured that his team was alert, ensuring that there would have been a chance – however remote – of preventing the tragedy.

All this reflects poorly on the training of the troops deployed with the road opening party. This brings us to the matter of training of troops, a growing cause of concern. It is a fact that training of the central paramilitary forces has suffered over the years. Continuous deployment of troops, absence of any reserves – including training companies – and a large intake of troops around 2013-2014 to fill vacancies as well as to aid expansion has played havoc with training systems. But that is not all. The attitude of Indian Police Service officers who lead the force ­– who do not assign any priority to training – is also to blame.

When I served with the Border Security Force, I recall that the post of Inspector General (Training) – responsible for formulating training policies for troops – was used mainly as a parking slot for officers on the verge of retirement or wanting a posting to Delhi for personal reasons. Merit was rarely a consideration for filling up this important post. It is possible that the same attitude plagues the training position in the Central Reserve Police Force.

The fourth failure is that of the Centre’s Kashmir policy. Prime Minister Narendra Modi said on Friday that security forces had been given a free hand to punish those responsible for the attack. The question is: why did it take this massive tragedy for him to realise the seriousness of the situation in Kashmir? It is well known that South Kashmir is the hotbed of militancy. Then, what prevented security forces from operating proactively there? Even if one might concede that the previous government in Jammu and Kashmir was somewhat sympathetic to militants, the state has been governed by the Centre since the government collapsed in June. What has then prevented the government from operating proactively?

In the aftermath of the Pulwama attack, several voices – official and unofficial – blamed Pakistan for the tragedy. The narrative is that militants carried out this operation in “despair”. This is an immature understanding of the situation. While the role of Pakistan in fomenting trouble in Kashmir is beyond a doubt, it cannot be said that it is the only reason. Pakistan is exploiting the weaknesses of India’s Kashmir policy to the hilt. This is why New Delhi needs to urgently address its policies on Kashmir.

Additionally, militants do not operate out of despair. They operate whenever they find that security forces have let down their guard. They attack security forces at their weakest point after meticulous planning and preparation. This is why security forces in Kashmir cannot afford to let their guard down even for a moment. It is for their commanders to ensure this through adequate training and continuous supervision.

Finally, the fifth failure is the attitude of India towards its paramilitary soldiers. They are treated as second-class soldiers and are poorly paid and under equipped as compared to their counterparts in the Army. They are even deprived of pension of the kind Army personnel are entitled to. The lack of proper equipment such as bulletproof vehicles and jackets also seriously compromises their efficiency and morale. All this must change.


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