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‘Aurangzeb’ — reimagining the misunderstood emperor

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If we glance back to review some of the most controversial figures of Indian medieval past, we should have no difficulty conjuring up the image of Aurangzeb Alamgir, the sixth Mughal emperor of the subcontinent. Aurangzeb to some, survives as a religious fanatic, whose treatment of his subjects specifically Hindu, and Jain communities was brutally inhumane, and unfair. His alleged adherence to narrow minded Islamic chauvinism is also held responsible for destroying the legacy of tolerance built by Akbar, leading to the disintegration of the empire. It is the inconsistency of the standard view of the emperor with the ‘historical’ Aurangzeb that this tantalising book under the title Aurangzeb: The Life and Legacy of India’s Most Controversial King examines, and enriches our understanding of Aurangzeb as a compounded individual, whose personality reflected the complexities of the world he inhabited.
Author Audrey Truschke, renowned American historian, stresses that rational understanding of Aurangzeb based on ‘serious history’ supersedes the oversimplification and high-minded dogmatism of ‘defensive’ agenda (proposed by earlier thinkers) that has been channeled into two directions. In the first case, the aura of Aurangzeb as a despot is balanced by pairing off the ‘orthodox’ Aurangzeb with his predecessor the ‘heterodox’ Akbar. At the heart of this binary, lies the argument that Aurangzeb’s austere religiosity prevented him from fully assimilating Indian values, unlike Akbar, whose flexible and laid-back “Muslimness” eased him into Indian syncretism, making him thereby an acceptable ruler of the subcontinent. Many view Aurangzeb’s kingship, as the triumph of sectarianism over the tradition of pluralism established by Akbar. This assertion has also shaped contemporary opinion, that unjustly holds Aurangzeb responsible for catalyzing a tragic course of events that saw the ultimate partition of India in 1947. The second line of thought although corrects many misconceptions about Aurangzeb, but it refuses to see flaws in him. To think of him as without any imperfections would again be a far cry from forming any sort of realistic perception of the emperor. She emphatically argues that proper historical research is the only effective stratagem as opposed to “defensive” thinking that can help us demystify Aurangzeb’s personality. By this she implies an examination of Aurangzeb’s figure, which is independent of political propaganda, religious fanaticism, and nationalist sentiments and to study him purely in the light of historical data.
The book enacts a fascinating reassessment of Aurangzeb, by recognizing him as a product of his age, as opposed to previous research that makes the elementary mistake of judging Aurangzeb by modern sensibilities. Aurangzeb’s actions do begin to make sense, when he is placed within the context of Indian codes of conduct and values rather than within the context of twenty first century codes and values. We see a prince who wades through blood, to ascend the imperial throne, not because he is a villain, but because he is following his ancestral tradition that accepts fratricide on one’s way to the crown; encrypted in the age old Mughal slogan “yatakhtyatabut” (either the throne or the grave). Bloody wars of succession that pitted brother against brother, and son against father, were a normal feature of Mughal rule and not Aurangzeb’s phenomenon as amplified by his modern detractors. The containment and defeat of his rival brothers naturally forms focus of Aurangzeb’s concern during ascension struggle. The author rightly points out, that if their roles were reversed, Dara Shukoh, Aurangzeb’s eldest brother, and his major rival for the throne, would not have acted differently because showing generosity to a beaten adversary would cost one their victory and their life.
Modern scholars have pointed out that kingship in India was regarded as open-ended in nature, with rulers constantly facing challenges to their authority if they were perceived, in any way, weak by tributaries, and subordinates. It was therefore organic for Indian kings to rule with an iron hand, to maintain peace, and to keep the integrity of kingdom intact. Truschke highlights that the punitive measures that Aurangzeb took against some Hindu temples were not a religious harassment (as his detractors have imagined), but a political penalty for supporting subversive elements within the realm. To ensure order and safety, and to preserve balance in society, also formed part of the recognized role of a king- a dynamic that resonates well with Aurangzeb’s vision of justice. It was therefore out of his concern for public safety that Aurangzeb constrained religious celebrations, including Hindu festivals of Holi, and Dewali, and the Muslim commemoration of Muharram. William Darlymple, in his novel, White Mughals, evokes disturbing graphic details of the condition of deathly chaos, that such festivities often transformed into by the end of the day. One cannot help but appreciate the wisdom behind Aurangzeb’s protective measures. Truschke tells us that in Aurangzeb’s India Hindu and Jain communities were treated equally well as their Muslim counterparts. She makes her case by alluding to numerous instructions issued by the emperor to state officials to protect temples from “unnecessary intervention”, as well as to grant land and monetary favours to Hindu and Jain religious institutions. The author reveals that Aurangzeb’s name is preserved in laudatory tone in vernacular Jain literature, of the period which offers testimonial to his religious leeway. Truschke observes that the Mughal kings acted within the traditional mores of the time- but they also had their own distinct qualities: Akbar’s was establishing a legacy of tolerance; Shah Jehan is known for his architectural brilliance; and Aurangzeb’s is his supreme sense of justice. But sometimes his notion of justice had to be configured to suit political needs. For example the dethronement of his father Shah Jehan cannot be justified under any principle of justice.
The authors highlights that what makes Aurangzeb unique, is perhaps his vaulting political ambition. During the last ten years of his life, his ambition turned in directions unprecedented for a man of Mughal line, for he conquered the Deccan “a prize” that had been coveted by the Mughals for generations. With the absorption of the south Indian states of Bijapur, and Golconda, the Mughal Empire stretched to its maximum limit. But his ambition, the writer reflects, also became his Achilles heel, for it had severely drained the resources and prevented him from passing on his legacy to an able successor.
In many ways, Aurangzeb can be likened to Shakespearean heroes, who are generally overreachers. Driven by their enterprising impulses, they tax their abilities to the full; exert all their faculties of mind, will, energy and in doing so achieve many features of heroic grandeur. But their obsession with one thing often spells out their own misfortune. Aurangzeb’s intoxication with enlarging his kingdom, threw him off balance- a mistake that finds an echo in his private writings. The author alludes to his letters to his sons, which are heavy with an elegiac tone lamenting his weakness and human fickleness, for example, when he says “I came as a stranger and I leave as a stranger.”


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War or peace?

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By Dr Akmal Hussain

Foreign Minister Shah Mahmud Qureshi on Sunday, April 7, in a press briefing in Multan, announced that the government had “reliable” information that India was planning another attack on Pakistan. He revealed that during a meeting of the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security, the three service chiefs had indicated that they were ready with plans of multiple strikes against Pakistan across a wide front and were awaiting a “political nod”, which was duly given by PM Modi during the meeting.
After the political boomerang of the failed Balakot strike, simple statistical theory would suggest to the military mind that the larger the number of strikes next time the higher the probability of at least one succeeding. The chances of partial success would increase if the air attack is across a wide front: the defending air force would have to spread itself thin and so the number of intercepting aircraft that could be fielded against any one group of attackers would be reduced.
Such a military adventure by India would not simply be a repeat strike after Balakot. It would be a precipitous escalation, fraught with the risk of full-scale conventional war that could quickly lead to a catastrophic nuclear exchange. When India suffered a setback in the Balakot engagement, they reportedly readied themselves for a missile strike against three Pakistani cities on the night of February 27.
There is no technology in existence that can determine whether or not incoming missiles have a nuclear payload. So Pakistan’s declaration that they would launch triple the number of missiles in retaliation, as soon as Indian missiles left their launch pads, carried the grim possibility of a nuclear war in the Subcontinent. If we had come so close to Armageddon soon after even a single abortive strike, imagine how much greater would be the risk of escalation to the nuclear level during a full-scale conventional war.
At present, and in the foreseeable future, two aspects of the structure of the India-Pakistan relationship create a hair trigger that can quickly and repeatedly bring the two countries to flashpoint. First, a popular freedom movement in Kashmir that, despite their protracted coercion, Indian security forces have been unable to suppress. It has instead produced a pantheon of martyrs and a new generation of militant youths willing to sacrifice themselves for freedom. Under these circumstances the internal dynamics of the Kashmiri movement can generate acts of violent rebellion against Indian troops at any time.
Second, on the other side of the border for many years non-state groups of militant extremists who have off and on received patronage continue to exist. The toxic mix of these two elements creates an environment in which spectacular acts of violence by Kashmiri youth could be blamed on “Pakistan-based terrorists” by India. This could intensify tensions, precipitating another military conflict. The past cannot be taken as a guide to say how it will end, whether in peace or nuclear war.
Given the firepower of modern conventional weaponry, significant loss of territory can occur during the initial onslaught that could escalate to the use of battlefield nuclear weapons. Once nuclear weapons are used on enemy troops, all-out nuclear war would follow. The recent history of India-Pakistan military conflict however has shown that even before a full-scale conventional war, a limited, localised battle can bring the two sides to the nuclear precipice.
For example, during the Kargil conflict in 1999 when the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif flew to Washington to ask the then US president Clinton to help end the conflict, he was shown satellite pictures of nuclear weapons being loaded onto F16s as evidence for a shocked PM of how close the two countries were to a nuclear war. Then again during the first two days of the February 2019 conflict involving limited Air Force engagements, nuclear missiles were reportedly readied on the night of February 27 for use by both sides.
So far these confrontations have induced timely intercession by the international community and peoples of the Subcontinent have survived by the skin of their teeth. But what a future confrontation will bring, whether we live or die in a nuclear war is inherently uncertain. Its probability cannot be estimated.
Some take comfort in the fact that seven confrontations in the past did not result in full-scale war as international pressure to defuse tensions worked. However, this 100 percent success in preventing war in the past cannot be used as a basis for saying it will not occur the next time around. This is because in society as much as in the relationship between states the averages of the past do not necessarily hold into the future. This is unlike natural phenomena where averages of the past as expressed in natural laws do hold into the future.
For example, take the law of gravity: if you had dropped an object and it fell to the ground yesterday, there is a high probability that it would fall again if you dropped it tomorrow. But in society, probability estimates which are essentially based on projecting the past into the future are not possible in principle. The pattern of social phenomena and human behaviour observed in the past can in the future be shattered by unique events or a combination of unique events.
As the preceding discussion argues, even a limited conventional conflict following a terrorist incident can quickly escalate to the nuclear threshold. It is vital, therefore, for the two countries supported by the world community to address the explosive structure of a situation that leads to repeated military confrontation.
Millions of citizens in both countries are mired in poverty, illiteracy and disease. Thousands of children are dying at birth every day; of those who survive birth, thousands die before they are five years old. Of the children who live beyond five years, millions are suffering from malnutrition, their bodies stunted, their brains dulled. Millions of children roam the streets and alleys, deprived of quality education, abandoned by society and state and living without hope. Instead of halting this massacre of innocents together, the two states are marching in lockstep to a nuclear catastrophe.
It is time for the leaderships of both India and Pakistan to reflect on the irrationality and inhumanity of using proxy wars or ‘surgical strikes’ as a means of achieving national security. The power of a nation lies not in following the course of mutual annihilation but pursuing the path of peace for the welfare of its citizens. The leaderships of the two countries should dip their cupped hands into their shared civilisational well-springs. Imbibe the sense of compassion and human solidarity to care for our children rather than killing them.

 
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Rubbing salt on the wounds:

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By Aleem Faizee

Another assault on the people of Malegaon – this is how a shopkeeper in Malegaon reacted to the news of the BJP fielding Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur from Bhopal against Congress’ Digvijaya Singh in this Lok Sabha election.
It’s like rubbing salt on our wounds, another Malegaon resident said.
For the people in Malegaon, the announcement of Pragya Thakur’s candidature has brought back the ghastly memories of 29 September 2008, when the city was rocked by a bomb blast. Thakur is facing trial in the case.
On the night of the blast, it was about 9.40 pm and people were about to finish Salaat-ut-Taraweeh – special night prayers offered during the month of Ramadan – when they heard a loud sound of explosion. At first, they thought it could be a cylinder blast accident. But it soon emerged that it was a bomb blast.
The blast spot was just metres away from the Ladies Fashion Market at Anjuman Chowk where a huge crowd of women and children were busy shopping for Eid al Fitr. There was chaos near Bhikku Chowk – the site of the blast. People carried the bleeding victims, more than a hundred, to hospitals using whatever means they could find.
The blast claimed six lives. One of them was 5-year-old Farheen Shaikh who was out to buy some snacks and was on her way back home to have Ramadan dinner with her grandmother.
Among the injured was Abdullah Jamaluddin Ansari of Shakeel Transport. The 75-year-old man, during initial investigation, had said he had noticed the LML Freedom motorcycle, which was later traced to Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur and led to her arrest, parked in front of his office since afternoon that day. He had also informed the police chowki, a stone’s throw away from the blast site, but claimed that no action was taken.
Javed Ansari, owner of a photocopier shop, was also injured in the Malegaon blast. It took him over three years to recover and resume work.
But for these blast victims, life has never been the same since that September night.
While Javed Ansari and the family of Farheen Shaikh left the locality after the blast, Shakeel Transport’s Abdullah Ansari died last year. Following the blast, Ansari often looked at the wall clock in his shop, which had stopped working at 9.37 pm – the time of the blast – and waited for justice.
One doesn’t know how he would have reacted to the news of Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur joining the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and contesting the Lok Sabha election.
By fielding Sadhvi Pragya, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) wants people to believe that she and other accused arrested in various blast cases were ‘framed in fabricated cases’ and that ‘saffron terror’ is a myth.
But while doing so the, BJP has undermined the fact that Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur still remains a key accused in the 2008 Malegaon blast case. As per court papers, the first evidence that led to her arrest was the LML Freedom motorcycle that was registered in her name and was used to plant the bomb. There are also some audio tapes and visuals too. Based on these evidences, the Bombay trial court judge had observed that there was enough ground to establish Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur’s role in the blast.
Ironically, while nominating Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur as the party candidate, the BJP did not think about the kind of message this would send to all the world leaders with whom Narendra Modi has often taken up the issue of terrorism.
The people of Malegaon, who had been hearing about the pressure on some officers and public prosecutor Rohini Salian ‘to go soft’ in the case, have almost lost all hope of getting justice. Wife of Mumbai ATS chief Hemant Karkare – the officer who initially investigated the case – had turned down then-Gujarat chief minister Narendra Modi’s monetary compensation after 26/11 attacks.
Therefore, the BJP’s decision to field Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur in this election is neither shocking nor surprising for most people in Malegaon. But it is painful, especially for the blast victims and their families.

 
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Majboot Sarkars Overrated?

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By Amir

Prior to the 1990s, coalition governments in Indian politics were considered to be an aberration and not particularly desirable. The lack of coalitions in India was clearly tied to the one-party preponderance of the Congress. So, when the party sensed defeat in the 1989 Lok Sabha election, it tried to remind voters of how shambolic the 1977 Janata government had been.
The VP Singh-led National Front government formed in 1989 was perhaps the strangest political entity that people had witnessed in Indian politics. Propped up by the Left parties on one side, and the right-wing BJP that provided support with its 86 seats on the other – the government proved to be short lived.
The grand old party then supported the Chandrashekhar Singh government for four months, after which it decided to withdraw support and elections in 1991 brought back a Congress-led coalition government in the country. With that, the era of coalition politics was well and truly upon us.
Coalition governments were the new normal in Indian politics and would continue to be so until 2014, when the Narendra Modi-led government became the first in three decades since 1984, to win a clear majority.
In 1996, there was a short-lived Vajpayee-led BJP government for 13 days, followed by the rather soporific one led by HD Deve Gowda that lasted until 1997. After that, IK Gujral led the United Front coalition government that lasted from April 1997 to March 1998.
By then, the political scenario of the country was beginning to look a bit like a game of musical chairs. However, things stabilised with Atal Bihari Vajpayee returning in 1998, hanging on for a year and then getting re-elected in 1999 to finally last a whole term.
After that, with a full decade of the Congress led United Progressive Alliance leading the way, Indian politics developed a version of the two party system, rather, a two coalition system. Numerous political parties have coalesced around BJP and the Congress in the form of the National Democratic Alliance and the United Progressive Alliance, respectively.
Congress governments in coalition have brought about some of the most momentous and far-reaching changes. It was the Narasimha Rao-led government that introduced the economic reforms, which for better or worse, changed the country tremendously.
One simple indicator of the worth of coalitions is the fact that many thought that the UPA-I government was too hobbled by the presence of the Left, as it was a hindrance to the economic reforms associated with Congress governments since 1991.
The withdrawal of Left support, followed by the more emphatic victory that led to UPA-II in 2009, was supposed to bring in a more decisive and unfettered government. Yet, it is the UPA-I government that is remembered for the succession of rights-based legislation it introduced, while UPA II has come to be associated with crony capitalism.
Similarly, the NDA-I government of Vajpayee, with all of its coalition pulls and pressures ensured two things. First, the core and often contentious BJP issues, which are Article 370, Babri Masjid and Uniform Civil Code, were relegated to the back-burner.
Second, the Vajpayee-led BJP government could well and truly be said to have a fringe and a centre, with the fringe remaining where any fringe should belong.
However, the ruling BJP government of the day has once again brought the core contentious issues to the forefront. It has also ensured that the fringe encompasses the party uniformly, leaving no hint of nuance or differentiation.
What this suggests is that weaker coalitions may actually perform better. More importantly, coalitions are able to more naturally weave in the vital regional parties that act as breakwaters in the path of potentially elective despotism.
Are majority governments over-rated?
What have supposedly strong and stable majority governments been able to do? Have they taken decisive measures or brought about ‘big-ticket economic reforms’, untroubled by the petty pulls of coalition partners?
Take the 1984 Rajiv Gandhi government with its mammoth majority of above 400 hundred seats. In less than two years, it started playing communally divisive politics around the Babri Masjid and Shah Bano issues.
The Congress thought it was being cleverly even handed by dealing out both majority and minority communal cards. The drift in the Rajiv Gandhi government could be sensed right in the middle of its term when it lost badly in the Haryana assembly elections of 1987. It lost the hugely symbolic Allahabad by-election in 1988 to V.P. Singh, and the rest we are prone to saying, is history.
The question then is this: Could the supposed strength and stability provided by majority governments be overrated? What has the Modi government achieved on the back of its huge mandate? Has it squandered that majority much like the Rajiv Gandhi led government of 1984-89? Can Modi return to power? This has been a bit of a see-saw question.
When Modi’s government came to power with a huge landslide, or ‘tsunami’ if you will, conventional wisdom was that he was here to stay for at least two terms. The UP assembly elections in 2017 seemed to confirm this. After that, it has been more of a will he/won’t he guessing game. The jury is well and truly out on this one.

 
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