By Pushp Saraf
Ahead of the crucial LokSabha polls, the government seems determined to whip up security fears about Jammu and Kashmir beginning with threats to abolish Article 35-A and Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, arrests of political activists, institution of cases by the National Investigation Agency and the ban on the Jamaat-e-Islami (J&K) and the Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). It is hard to avoid the conclusion that its aim is to influence elections beyond the Valley.
In fact, on March 10, Chief Election Commissioner Sunil Arora, while announcing the election schedule in Delhi, pointed to the security constraints in simultaneously holding the already delayed assembly elections in J&K. He said there could be “at least” eight candidates in each assembly segment and each of them would require an adequate number of security personnel. To substantiate his argument, he recalled panchayat and urban bodies’ elections held “long ago” and said that many contestants were still staying in government guest houses “at government’s expense”.
In contrast, the central government in an official release on March 22 claimed credit for having “revitalised grassroots democracy in J&K by conducting elections peacefully for the first time in 2018 for urban local bodies after 2005 and for panchayats after 2011”. It referred to the high polling percentage without going into details. The polling was indeed impressive in Jammu and Ladakh regions compared to the turbulent Valley where it was seriously affected by the non-participation of two main regional parties—the National Conference (NC) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP)—apart from the usual election boycott call given by secessionist organisations. Urban bodies’ elections were held in October 2018 and panchayat polls in December. The Union government’s recollection of them months later could not be easily explained, that too in a release announcing the imposition of a ban on the separatist JKLF under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.
Who is right? The CEC who ironically gets its feedback on security matters mostly from official agencies apart from making an on-the-spot assessment, or the government which ought to know the actual position?
The government had gone on to withdraw the security cover of many mainstream political workers and leaders along with that of separatists. Faced with vociferous protests by main Opposition parties, the governor, Satya Pal Malik, sought to mollify them two days before polling in the first phase of parliamentary elections on April 11 by restoring the security cover of about 400 political workers and activists. Malik has passed the buck for the earlier action to the bureaucracy. This is ironic considering the Union government’s assertion that the entire exercise had begun at its behest from the day the governor’s administration took over on June 20, 2018. Has he bitten off more than he could chew by trying to scuttle a central initiative?
NC Vice-President and former Chief Minister Omar Abdullah has sharply highlighted the difference in stance on assembly polls and withdrawal of security for politicians in a series of tweets: “At a time when the administration has used the excuse of the security environment to refuse to conduct assembly elections this decision is all the more bizarre”; “I wish to place on record my strong objections to the decision of @jandkgovernor& @JmuKmrPolice to withdraw security of politicians like @shahfaesal, @parawahid& Engineer Rashid among others”; “God forbid should anything happen to any of these politicians who have had their security withdrawn Governor Malik & his administration will be personally responsible”; “In this absence of any logical reason for this withdrawal of security to these mainstream politicians the decision smacks of personal vendetta & victimisation.” (Shah Faesal is the IAS topper-turned-politician who launched a party called the Jammu and Kashmir People’s Movement; Wahid Parra is the PDP youth president and spokesperson and Engineer Rashid is a former legislator and a candidate in the Baramulla parliamentary constituency.)
Seeking the EC’s “immediate intervention”, PDP President and former Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti has called the move “a kind of pre-poll rigging”. The Congress too is seething as it has to bear the brunt of this move along with the NC and the PDP, especially in the Valley where the BJP banks on the votes of migrants living outside. The Congress had salt added to its wound when the official accommodation of its state president, GA Mir, was withdrawn just before he filed his nomination for the highly-sensitive Anantnag parliamentary constituency on April 3.
The governor’s administration may find a reason for its action, but its timing after the Model Code of Conduct kicked in may invite scrutiny. Mir expressed his anguish: “The lives of Congress leaders are being put at risk by withdrawing their security aiming to restrict their political movements, but the Congress Party will not be cowed down by such pressure tactics.”
Following complaints by political parties, J&K’s Chief Electoral Officer, Shailendra Kumar, is reported to have apprised the EC about the developments and sought views from the government.
According to a much-publicised home ministry version on April 5, the J&K governor’s administration has, since its takeover last year, withdrawn security cover for “919 undeserving persons thereby freeing 2,768 police personnel and 389 vehicles”. The action was taken because “it was observed by the centre that many undeserving persons managed to get security cover resulting in lack of state police resources for the public at large. Accordingly, the Union home ministry directed the state govt that a case by case in-depth review may be taken on merits”. The J&K State Security Review Coordination Committee has held regular meetings to examine all the cases to ensure “strict compliance as per norms” and will continue the exercise. The list includes 22 “separatist leaders, giving a clear message to those who are involved in anti-national activities”.
The first major announcement about security withdrawal was made three days after the Pulwama killings of 45 CRPF personnel in a Jaish-e-Mohammad suicide bomb attack on February 15. It was confined to five separatist leaders—Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Abdul GaniBhat, Bilal Lone, Hashim Qureshi, hijacker-turned-politician, and Shabir Shah who has been in jail since 2017 and has never been averse to talking to anyone—a stand that invited his suspension from the united Hurriyat Conference in 1996 when he violated its decision and met then US ambassador in India Frank Wisner. Incidentally, the first three were members of the Mirwaiz-led Hurriyat Conference and have figured in talks with previous central governments, including the Vajpayee one.
The next order on February 20 covered another 18 separatist leaders, including Tehreek-e-Hurriyat founder Syed Ali Shah Geelani, mostly under house arrest, and JKLF chief Yasin Malik, who is at present in jail but lives in crowded Maisuma bazaar in Srinagar, and more than 150 mainstream politicians—Shah Faesal, Wahid Para and Engineer Rashid among them.
From a distance, it appears unusual that separatist leaders ought to have been given official security. How they are treated depends upon the government’s perception and their mutual relations. The elected state governments led by the PDP and the NC in particular have valiantly tried to engage them in a battle of wits, fighting for the same turf. Most of the central governments have encouraged them to hold dialogue, mindful that their positive response would expose their lives to danger at the hands of Pakistan and terrorist outfits which want to wrest the Valley by hook or by crook.
The present central government has not been able to establish any rapport with the separatists despite the appointment of an interlocutor. Some of the actions and utterances of BJP leaders in the rest of the country have widened the chasm between them, as well as between the government and the Muslim-majority population. Separatist leaders have never bothered about the official security which they call “a non-issue” as “they never asked for it and wherever it was given, the government had gone by its own threat perception”.
It is all the more amazing that separatist and mainstream leaders were clubbed together in the publicity offensive surrounding the security withdrawal. The NC has time and again been called upon to make supreme sacrifices for standing by the Accession and the Indian Union. The PDP too, in its short existence, has suffered loss of leaders.
In yet another move, the government has from April 7 shut the 296-km-long national highway between Jammu and Srinagar for civilian traffic two days a week (Wednesdays and Saturdays) to facilitate an exclusive run for convoys of security personnel. The highway is the virtual lifeline of J&K and the only important road link between the Valley and the rest of the country. Lakhs of commuters, including those staying on either side of the road, have been put to tremendous inconvenience as a result, notwithstanding the government’s claim of having made provisions to take care of emergencies. It has also turned out to be a bad advertisement for foreign tourists in the Valley. This is an anti-climax as the civilian traffic has been normal for at least two decades after serious disruptions at the peak of militancy in the 1990s and its aftermath.
With the arrival of the elections, J&K seems to be the crucible for the ruling BJP’s experimentation. This could have dangerous consequences.
India’s perilous obsession with Pakistan
By Nissim Mannathukkaren
Come Indian elections, the bogey of Pakistan has overwhelmed the nationalist discourse in the shrillest manner, with the Prime Minister and other Ministers’ relentless branding of the Congress/Opposition as ‘anti-national’ and as ‘agents of Pakistan’. Further, the Prime Minister even made an unprecedented threat of using nuclear weapons against Pakistan.
As a country born of the two-nation theory based on religion, and then having to suffer dismemberment and the consequent damage to the very same religious identity, it is obvious why Islamic Pakistan must have a hostile Other in the form of a ‘Hindu India’. But what is not obvious is why India, a (much larger) secular nation, must have a hostile antagonist in the form of Pakistan.
It is widely recognised that the fulcrum of the Pakistani state and establishment is an anti-India ideology and an obsession with India. But what has scarcely received notice is that India’s post-Independence nationalism has been equally driven by an obsession with Pakistan. Of course, this obsession acquires a pathological dimension under regimes, like the present one, which thrive on hyper-nationalism and a ‘Hindu India’ identity.
But, this hyper-nationalistic urge to ‘defeat’ Pakistan and to gloat over every victory, both real and claimed, is ultimately self-defeating, and comes with huge human and material costs. Much of these costs are hidden by jingoism masquerading as nationalism.
Words often used regarding the Pakistani state’s actions, even by critical Pakistani voices, are ‘delusional’ and ‘suicidal’, and rightly so. For, no level-headed state would seek to attain military parity with a country that is six and half times larger in population, and eight and a half times bigger economically. HussainHaqqani, the Pakistani diplomat and scholar, compared it to “Belgium rivalling France or Germany”. Pakistan’s vastly disproportionate spending on the military has been self-destructive for a poor nation.
In 1990, Pakistan was ahead of India by three places in the Human Development Index. In 2017, Pakistan was behind India by 20 ranks, a sad reflection of its ruinous policies.
More critically, the Pakistani state’s sponsorship of Islamist terror groups has been nothing less than catastrophic. What the world, including India, does not recognise is that Pakistan, ironically, is also one of the worst victims of Islamist terrorism. In the period 2000-2019, 22,577 civilians and 7,080 security personnel were killed in terrorism-related violence in Pakistan (the number of civilian/security personnel deaths from Islamist terrorism in India, excluding Jammu and Kashmir, was 926 in during 2000-2018).
The fact that Pakistan has suffered much more than India in their mutual obsession cannot hide the equally serious losses that India has undergone and is willing to undergo in its supposedly muscular pursuit of a ‘no dialogue’ policy with Pakistan.
Wars and military competition produce madness. Nothing exemplifies this more than India-Pakistan attempts to secure the Siachen Glacier, the inhospitable and highest battle terrain in the world. India alone lost nearly 800 soldiers (until 2016) to weather-related causes only. Besides, it spends around ?6 crore every day in Siachen. Operation Parakram (2001-02), in which India mobilised for war with Pakistan, saw 798 soldier deaths and a cost of $3 billion. This is without fighting a war. Add to this the human and economic costs of fighting four wars.
Granted, the proponents of India’s muscular nationalism who want only a military solution in Kashmir might close their eyes to the killings of some 50,000 Kashmiri civilians and the unending suffering of Kashmiris, but can they, as nationalists, ignore, the deaths of around 6,500 security personnel in Kashmir and the gargantuan and un-estimated costs of stationing nearly 5 lakh military/para-military/police personnel in Kashmir for 30 years?
Ten years ago, Stephen P. Cohen, the prominent American scholar of South Asia, called the India-Pakistan relationship “toxic” and notably termed both, and not just Pakistan, as suffering from a “minority” or “small power” complex in which one is feeling constantly “threatened” and “encircled”. Tellingly, he argues that it is the disastrous conflict with Pakistan that has been one of the main reasons why India has been confined to South Asia, and prevented from becoming a global power.
Here, one should ask the most pertinent question: why does India compete with Pakistan in every sphere, from military to sport, rather than with, say, China, which is comparable in size and population, and which in 1980 had the same GDP as India? (China’s GDP is almost five times that of India’s now.)
Of course, emulating China need not mean emulating its internal authoritarianism or its almost colonial, external economic expansionism. On the contrary, it is to learn from China’s early success in universalising health care and education, providing basic income, and advancing human development, which as AmartyaSen has argued, is the basis of its economic miracle. It is precisely here that India has failed, and is continuing to fail.
Therefore, despite India being one of the fastest growing major economies in the world since 1991 (yet, only ranked 147 in per capita income in 2017), its social indicators in many areas, including health, education, child and women welfare, are abysmal in comparison with China’s. Worryingly, in the focus on one-upmanship with Pakistan, India’s pace in social indicator improvement has been less than some poorer economies too. The phenomenal strides made by Bangladesh in the social sector are an example.
Here, a look at the military expenditures is revealing: while India spent $63.9 billion (2017) and Pakistan $9.6 billion (2018-19), Bangladesh spent only $3.45 billion (2018-19). Only a muscular and masculine nationalism can take pride in things such as becoming the fifth largest military spender in the world, or being the world’s second largest arms importer. The bitter truth hidden in these details is that India, ranked 130 in the HDI (and Pakistan, 150), simply cannot afford to spend scarce resources on nuclear arsenals, maintaining huge armies or developing space weapons. Besides, in an increasingly globalised world, military resolution between a nuclear India and Pakistan is almost impossible.
The more India, the largest democracy in the world, defines itself as the Other of Pakistan, a nation practically governed by the military, the more it will become its mirror. Any nation that thrives by constructing a mythical external enemy must also construct mythical internal enemies. That is why the number of people labelled ‘anti-national’ is increasing in India. India has to rise to take its place in the world. That place is not being a global superpower, but being the greatest and most diverse democracy in the world. That can only happen if it can get rid of its obsession with Pakistan.
Symbol of New (Hindu) India?
By Sanjeev Ahluwalia
BJP president Amit Shah is technically correct to say that SadhviPragya Thakur, one of the accused in the September 2008 Malegaon (Maharashtra) bomb blast case, who is on bail, has a right, under our liberal electoral laws, to contest the elections. It hardly matters that she voluntarily claimed being part of the Hindutava forces which had pulverised the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992 and that an FIR has been registered against her by the Madhya Pradesh police on the orders of the Election Commission.
A galaxy of BJP leaders headed by Lal Krishna Advani, who went on to become deputy prime minister, and Hindutava firebrands Version 1 from the 1990s era — SadhviRithambra, VinayKatiar, Hari Vishnu Dalmia, et al — were criminally indicted for conspiracy but let off by a CBI special court in 2001. The Allahabad high court upheld the order of acquittal in 2010. But curiously, the Supreme Court directed that the case be revived in April 2017, under the NarendraModi government.
To be honest, there was little reason, back then, not to indict both Kalyan Singh, the BJP chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, and P.V. Narasimha Rao, the Congress Prime Minister. Culpability for dereliction of duty runs deep and inefficiencies in the judicial system help gaming transgressors.
Our laws consequently acknowledge this judicial gap and do not bar a candidate from political office, even though serious criminal charges have been drawn up in court against the person and a trial is under way.
But that does not fully explain why the BJP chose her. After all, Bhopal is not just any other seat. It is the capital of Madhya Pradesh and she has been pitted against Digvijay Singh, a former chief minister of the state and a senior Congress leader.
More to the point, isn’t she out of sync with the BJP government’s soothing signature tune of “Sabkasaath, sabkavikas” (with everyone, for everyone)? Does this signal a major change in stance and hitherto is revisionist social policy likely to overshadow the imperative for economic growth?
Pragya Thakur has no qualms about evoking her mystical powers to “damn” (curse) her opponents, demonstrating a conflation between her private well-being and that of all Hindus — a distinction which is necessary in those holding public office. But ascetics and mystics live by the code of “bhakti” — a submersive ecosystem, in which the followers are one with the guru. This leaves no space for the rule of earthly, common law.
Bhakts believe the spiritual power of an ascetic’s curse causes irreparable harm. Such pervasive, blind faith begs the question — should India have lawmakers who exult in evoking their spiritual powrs to shield themselves from the law?
Given these rough edges, what compelled the Modi-Shah team to field SadhviPragya from Bhopal? Two motivations suggest themselves.
First, electoral strength breeds hubris. Nominating Pragya Thakur sends the message that a new, assertively Hindu India is on its way and those with different views should make way.
Hinduism is resilient because it absorbs and subsumes other beliefs. Think Tamil Nadu 70 years ago. Anti-Brahmanism, rationalism and primacy for Tamil culture and language — versus Hindi — drove the atheist Dravida movement to its peak. Today, with political power firmly with the Tamil middle castes, ritualistic Hinduism is resurgent in Tamil Nadu.
Hinduism facilitates Sanskritisation — a religious version of the Stockholm syndrome, where the marginalised empathise with and seek to emulate their oppressors, thereby perpetuating the status quo.
Even the Congress Party has succumbed. The symbols of ritualistic Hinduism — special prayers at temples and endorsements from Hindu religious leaders — are the norm. This is canny, since Muslims and Christians have nowhere else to go, at the national level — though the BahujanSamaj Party and the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh; Trinamul Congress in West Bengal; TelanganaRashtraSamiti in Hyderabad, the Communists in Kerala and the AamAdmi Party in Delhi offer classically secular, regional alternatives.
An alternative driver behind Pragya Thakur’s nomination could be sheer desperation, in the absence of a NarendraModi wave, unlike 2014. After all, the party lost Madhya Pradesh along with two other cow belt states to the Congress only a few months ago during the state Assembly elections. Fielding the Sadhvi is sure to rake up Hindu resentment against the Congress for subscribing to a counter narrative of “Hindu terror” around the 2008 bomb blasts. The credibility of our police agencies has sunk so low that in the public’s perception, the “caged parrot” syndrome of ruling party capture, overrides the merits of any police action.
But multiple poll surveys, thus far, do not validate significant electoral loss for the BJP. The most recent endorsement comes from SurjitBhalla’s new book Citizen Raj: Indian Elections 1952-2019. He forecasts a simple majority of 274 for the BJP on its own. Lord Meghnad Desai, a British peer of Indian origin, also endorses a clear win.
NarendraModi is no one’s tool. Were he to succeed, his game would be to tame the tiger that he is riding. This is risky. But a more grounded strategy could well emerge, which seeks to rid Hinduism of its caste-based fractures; infuse the religion with modern concepts of universal human rights and worry more about generating income and wealth for all, rather than protecting India from without whilst dividing it from within.
The Modi-Shah duo’s dodgy electoral tactics are not new. Encouraging social divisiveness; kitchen cabinets to bypass government structures; centralisation of authority; a quasi-presidential form of campaigning and the systematic decimation of potential opponents — all these have all been used by other parties in the past. Banyan tree leadership is hardly unique to today’s BJP.
What is new is the blinding speed with which the Modi-Shah team has executed their strategy of building a “New India” — a narrative which promises to change social endowments and norms in ways that have never visualised previously. Status quoists will resist this seismic makeover. Beneficiaries will support it. Make up your mind, dear reader, where you belong.
‘The TINA trick’
By Anil Dharker
This state of despondency arises from many factors, the major one being the disappointment with the performance of NarendraModi’s government (bhakts always excepted).
Two abbreviations crop up in any conversation about the elections. Both give a dispiriting picture of the mood of the nation. The acronyms are NOTA and TINA, which as we all know, expand to None Of The Above and There Is No Alternative.
This state of despondency arises from many factors, the major one being the disappointment with the performance of NarendraModi’s government (bhakts always excepted). In 2014, there was a genuine Modi Wave caused by disillusionment with UPA’s drift and its alleged corruption; in direct contrast were Modi’s enticing promises of “development” and rooting out corruption and black money. The disasters of demonetisation and GST, rising unemployment and the unaddressed tragedy of agrarian distress has taken the sheen off Modi’s many promises.
NarendraModi knows; everyone in the BJP knows; thinking party supporters (bhakts always excepted) also know, that repeating the same promises again and again doesn’t fulfil them — action does — but implementation has either been negligible, or poor. This is why not one single speech of Modi talks of his government’s performance. It’s a strange thing to hear a prime minister going to the people for re-election without a word about five years of his government. Instead, he talks about his “muscular response” to Pakistan and he talks about Hindutva in a demagogic way reminiscent of Bal Thackeray, using words which a chief election commissioner like T N Seshan would have acted more strongly against.
Sadly, the EC is not the only institution the Modi government has eviscerated. If you really wanted to know what the BJP government has achieved in its five-year term, it’s this: Every institution, the Enforcement Directorate, CBI, the police in BJP-ruled states, the Income Tax department… name them, and they do the government’s bidding, even if many of their actions on the eve of elections are clearly political in nature and meant to influence the electorate.
This is where the TINA factor comes in. Even BJP supporters disillusioned with NarendraModi ask: If not Modi, who will be PM? Rahul Gandhi? Mamata Banerjee? Mayawati? They find all these options unacceptable. Unfortunately, people have short memories. Political turmoil brought in prime ministers as diverse as Morarji Desai, V P Singh, I K Gujral, Chandra Shekhar, DeveGowda and Charan Singh. Not all of them were a disaster. In any case, all of them were in the chair for just around a year each (except Desai, who had two years), far too short a time to judge a prime minister’s performance. More than that, it’s important to note the classic definition of a prime minister in a functioning democracy: He is the first among equals in the council of ministers. Would anyone in the present cabinet dare say that of NarendraModi? No wonder the BJP’s slogan for 2019 is “phirekbaar, Modisarkar”. And its manifesto is replete with photographs of Modi, significantly even on the cover. Apart from re-emphasising that Modi’s council of ministers consists of lightweights; the slogan underlines the fact that the BJP government is Modi, Modi and Modi. That’s how the TINA factor gets reinforced as part of the BJP’s planned campaign strategy.
Contrast that with the Congress’s slogan, “abhoga NYAY’, a play on the Hindi word to mean justice as well as highlight the party’s ambitious social welfare programme, with which it hopes to make an impact on the elections. It also removes any hint of a personality cult in the party, although clearly, Rahul Gandhi is the prime force in the election campaign. Perhaps, it’s also a tacit admission that the public perception of Rahul Gandhi as an unsuitable candidate for prime ministership hasn’t changed, although the man himself has grown impressively into a leadership role. But you need an open mind to notice that, and an open mind doesn’t seem to be a common attribute of our electorate, especially its urban component. The more educated you are, the more you are likely to hold on to your prejudices.
An interesting point to note is that even Indira Gandhi, a towering personality if ever there was one, used the slogan “garibihatao”, and not a personality-centric one. But that concealed the fact that she ruled her government and her party with an iron fist. Another interesting point to note is that in his constant attacks on “The Family” and “Dynasty”, Modi hasn’t said a word against Indira Gandhi. For all his visceral hatred of the Nehru-Gandhis, Modi is strangely silent about Indira: There’s obviously an unspoken and sneaking admiration there. When you think about it, it’s really not surprising. Indira Gandhi was the government, and no one else mattered. NarendraModi is the government, and he has made sure no one else matters. For all those enamoured of strong leadership, it might be salutary to remember its perils: Mrs Gandhi imposed the Emergency, she nationalised banks (a disaster in the long run), she abolished privy purses (a constitutional guarantee), she subverted most of our institutions, including even the judiciary, and she used departments like Income Tax to get even with political opponents. Aren’t the parallels uncanny? On the other hand, low-key, self-effacing personalities like LalBahadurShastri and Narasimha Rao made excellent prime ministers; in fact, the former had he not died so tragically early, may have lived to be our best PM ever.
NOTA, of course, is an expression of dissatisfaction with the whole political process, and who can blame people when we see the way our electioneering has been conducted, with its abuse and personal invective? But NOTA is not an option; the option really is this: Better not the devil we know than the devil we don’t, because the latter may turn out to be not a devil at all.