By K. K. Shahid
As Pakistan completed 71 years of independence recently, the debate regarding the vision its founding fathers had for the new-born state continues to simmer. Inherent in this deliberation is the question – albeit in hindsight – of whether the Partition was necessary in the first place.
In this regard, there has been a rise in scholarly work on inward critiques of the movement from the time. The latest among these is a collection of 14 essays, Muslims against Muslim League: Critiques of the Idea of Pakistan edited by Ali Usman Qasmi and Megan Eaton Robb.
The essays feature Muslim critics of Pakistan as ideologically diverse and as geographically spread as Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Rezaul Karim, among others.
Barbara D. Metcalf begins with ‘Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani and the Jami at Ulema-i-Hind,’ and the first essay sets the ball rolling on the insightful commentary of many renowned Islamist sceptics on the idea of Pakistan, observing it as an historical paradox. The essay narrates Madani’s quest to rid allegations against Muslims of being ‘foreigners,’ by establishing their religious and national right over a united India, and the challenges of establishing an Islamic state in an ideologically diverse land, which was naturally at loggerheads over the Muslim League’s demand for a separate Muslim state.
M Raisur Rehman, in his ‘The Partition Conundrum,’ tells tales from various qasbahs in what was to become India following the separation of Pakistan, and why many Muslims chose not to migrate to the newly formed homeland. He argues that there was no ‘linear response’ to the Muslim League’s Two-Nation theory among the Muslims, often with members of the same family opting for different courses amidst Partition.
Tahir Kamran’s essay ‘Choudhary Rahmat Ali and his Political Imagination’ discusses why the man who came up with the name Pakistan in the pamphlet Now or Never has largely remained on the periphery of the historical discourse in the state that adapted the name that he had proposed. One reason was his disdain for Muhammad Ali Jinnah; another was his envisioned Continent of Dinia – a deliberate distortion of the name India, wherein not only would all religious communities have their own regions, but which would safeguard the interests of all Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, which Pakistan failed to achieve.
Ali Usman Qasmi’s chapter on Maududi, ‘Differentiating between Pakistan and Napak-istan’ deserves special mention as a piece of scholarly work that not only contributed to bringing forth one of the most prominent Islamist critics of Pakistan – which the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami has been known as over the decades – but also provides a new perspective on the raison d’etre of his antagonism towards the idea of Pakistan. The essay argues that Maududi’s opposition didn’t come aboard the Indian nationalism bandwagon, or in alliance with Congress, but simply because he maintained that the concepts of nation, state and democracy contradicted Islam.
Megan Eaton Robb’s ‘Advising the Army of Allah’ focuses on another prominent Islamist, Ashraf Ali Thanawi, who wanted the Muslim League to transform into Lashkar-e-Allah, and whose eventual support for the party stemmed from his desire to attach the clergy to the Pakistan movement. Thanawi, hence, paradoxically, despite being critical of how the League functioned before he allied himself with it, was influential in the party’s Islamisation process, with leaflets attributed to him being published posthumously by the League to muster support for its Pakistan bid in the 1946 elections.
Ali Raza’s coverage of Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din is one of the most intriguing parts of the compilation, given his political trajectory that traversed Congress, the Communist Party of India, the Muslim League and the post-Partition Azad Pakistan Party. Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din is the only prominent leftist figure covered as an individual in this book, outside of the entire chapter dedicated to Islam and communism later on.
Markus Daechsel highlights Inayatullah Khan ‘al-Mashriqi’ as the ‘Visionary of Another Politics,’ arguably one of the most eccentric figures in the book, who claimed to have touched base with Darwinism, Adolf Hitler and the Nobel Prize Committee. He also came up with a national anthem of his own. His influence was such that his Khaksars – whose Islamist activism dominated the 1940s – eventually provided a decisive subplot to the Lahore Resolution, and indirectly influenced the creation of Pakistan by keeping the League on its toes.
Safoora Arbab’s ‘Nonviolence, Pukhtunwali and Decolonisation’ not only elaborates the non-violent struggles of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Khuda’i Khidmatgar, it also underscores the hostility expressed by the Muslim League – and eventually the state of Pakistan – towards it. Aptly, the essay begins with the Qissa Khani shooting of April 23, 1930 and culminates in Babra, Charsadda where the Khuda’i Khidmatgar protestors against the Public Security Ordinance Bill were gunned down on August 12, 1948.
In ‘Islam, Communism and the Search for a Fiction,’ Ammar Ali Jan delineates the curious case of two global political ideologies overlapping, and in India’s case finding the same origin: the Khilafat Movement. The chapter prominently features Shaukat Usmani, using him as an example to narrate the contradictions inherent in the communist struggle in British India.
Sarah Ansari uses Allah Bakhsh Soomro’s persona to differentiate between Muslim nationalists and nationalist Muslims, with her essay naturally focusing on politics in Sindh before and after Partition. In prioritising the ‘less familiar’ Soomro over GM Syed, to highlight the Sindhi nationalists’ antagonism towards the League, the author also attempts to take a shot at the long-mulled question of how events might have panned out had Soomro not been killed in 1943.
Newal Osman transits into Punjab in ‘Dancing with the Enemy,’ with those on the proverbial dance floor being Sikandar Hayat Khan and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and how their contrasting wariness vis-à-vis Congress rule in the centre, resulted in divergent visions for Pakistan. The essay argues that the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, instead of providing the safeguards that the Unionist leader was looking for, gave the League the impetus for the movement on a platter, with Sikander Hayat becoming an unwilling author of the Pakistan Resolution, which turned out to be nothing like the one he had suggested.
Neilesh Bose takes us into Bengal in ‘Religion between Region and Nation’ with the story of Rezaul Karim, who in his lifetime saw his turf as part of British India, then Pakistan, and eventually it was carved out as a separate Bangladesh state. Karim was a critic of European style nationalism and argued that Indian Muslims manifested a composite nationalism, which was an amalgamation of cultural, regional and religious factors.
In ‘The Pakistan that is Going to be Sunnistan’, Justin Jones encapsulates the concerns of the Shia leadership vis-à-vis the Muslim League ending up creating a Sunni-dominated state, even though Jinnah himself – along with other prominent League leaders – was a Shia. The Shi’a Political Conference created a sub-movement to safeguard the rights of Shias, as the League strived to do the same on behalf of the Indian Muslims, without creating too wide a divide between the two.
Abdul Majeed wraps up the book with ‘The Baluch Qaum of Qalat State’ and the accession of the princely state of Kalat to Pakistan. How this merger was completed continues to be a point of conjecture among the academics, with the Pakistani state being accused of annexing what is now the volatile province of Balochistan.
India’s Muslim obsession
By Adil Bhat
Pakistan has always been central to India’s right-wing political imagination. The bellicose narrative of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under the current leadership and direction of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has reached its nadir, with the two sides adopting offensive foreign policy postures. As India moves closer to the elections in April-May 2019, the public discourse on Pakistan is likely to become more obtrusive in the country, mainly for domestic political gains. While this is symptomatic to the Modi-led BJP, Pakistan has always been fundamental to the BJP’s politics, including those of the former and the late prime minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
Saba Naqvi’s book, Shades of Saffron: From Vajpayee to Modi, traces the evolution of the BJP through these two towering figures who led a nation of complex cultural and religious diversities by first creating an enemy within — the Indian Muslim — and associating it with the enemy without — Muslim Pakistan. Naqvi is a senior political journalist and commentator who worked as the political editor with India’s leading current affairs magazine Outlook. As a beat reporter she has covered the developments in the BJP for the last two decades. Arguing that the BJP has evolved in its political strategy, ideology and approach, her book also shows that there are continuities from its own ideological past.
As Indian politics gradually spiralled towards Hindu nationalism with Modi’s victory in 2014, the aggressive discourse on Hindu identity politics — diluting caste divisions and accentuating communal polarisation — came to prominence. While the issue of appropriation of caste is more about the BJP’s social engineering programme within the fold of Hinduism, the antagonisation of the Indian Muslim is in proximity to the political rhetoric on Pakistan.
The subject of caste mobilisation has been broached by the BJP leadership at all times. Continuing with the tradition of expanding its Hindu mass base, the party has persisted in its outreach towards backward castes and Dalits (untouchable caste). In pursuing its social engineering process, Banguru Laxman, a Dalit leader from Andhra Pradesh and member of the BJP’s ideological mentor Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), became president of the BJP in 2000. His appointment was a radical move in keeping with the party’s social engineering approach.
The BJP has mastered the art of expanding and retaining its social base. Moreover, in legitimising this strategy, the BJP tactfully abandoned the trend of anointing chief ministers from castes that are traditionally dominant in the states. For instance, in the Jat-dominated northern state of Haryana, the BJP chose Manohar Lal Khattar, a Punjabi-Khatri and former RSS pracharak (ideologue), as the first non-Jat chief minister. While a little misadventure with caste politics can disturb the social mass base of the BJP, its divisive communal politics have, on the other hand, consolidated the support of the previously warring castes.
The present leadership of the BJP has been more inclined towards hard Hindutva that has interchangeably been used as ‘Moditva’, which may be defined as that ‘phase of Hindutva personified in an individual’. Unlike his predecessor Vajpayee, who had visibly softened his approach towards Muslim minorities in 2004 in an attempt to project a secular face, Modi has, since his early days in the RSS, believed that in chasing Muslims the BJP may end up alienating Hindus.
Moreover, the hardening of communal sentiment was a fallout of the 2004 election debacle, which, according to Naqvi, led the party hardliners to revisit their “original agenda — focus on ideology and forget everything else.” While there has been constant change in the political narrative of the party — depending on the leadership — the ideological nucleus, that is, the RSS, has been committed to its Hindutva doctrine.
Veteran patriarch L.K. Advani faced the ire of the party and the mother organisation soon after his visit to Pakistan in June 2005; he was at the time leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha [Lower House] and made some controversial statements during his week-long visit. Advani’s overwhelming stature was diminished for his political naivety exhibited abroad; his invocation of Mohammad Ali Jinnah cost him his glorious political career, never to be redeemed again. Calling Jinnah a “great man” who promoted Hindu-Muslim unity, Advani expressed his remorse at the demolition of the Babri Masjid in the 1990s, calling it “the saddest day.” Adding further insult to injury, Advani sent ripples down to New Delhi when he said that Partition was irreversible and that there is a Pakistani in every Indian.
This was nothing short of “heresy for the party of the faithful”, writes Naqvi. Their ideological guru had just debunked an entire body of beliefs. This led to a political debacle within the party which resulted in Advani losing the support of the RSS. Another casualty was senior party leader Jaswant Singh who published an empathetic book on Jinnah, titled Jinnah: India, Partition, Independence. Following the publication of his book, Singh was unceremoniously expelled by then party president Rajnath Singh and reduced to insignificance.
Incidentally, the ghost of Jinnah still lurks in Modi’s India and continues to shape his present and future politics. A case in point is the May 2018 controversy over Jinnah’s portrait in Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), which led to a violent confrontation between Hindutva forces and AMU students. The outrage over the presence of Jinnah’s portrait, which had been hanging at the university since 1938, defines the BJP’s communalisation of politics.
Naqvi’s account of the BJP is a glimpse of modern India’s realpolitik that has wilfully sacrificed the principles of freedom and secularism enshrined in its Constitution at the altar of majoritarian Hindutva politics. As the author candidly narrates her journey inside the BJP, she foregrounds the party’s obsessive pursuits — Muslim first and Muslim last — from the Mughals in pre-colonial India to post-Partition Pakistan.
The relevance of the book lies in its detailed account of the evolution of the BJP and right-wing politics in India. As the country inches closer to the 2019 elections, it remains to be seen if the ghosts of history still haunt the political landscape of India and shape the uncertain future of the largest religious minority in the world: the Indian Muslims.
Shades of Saffron: From Vajpayee to Modi
By Saba Naqvi
The tyranny of vowels
By Syed Nomanul Haq
Urdu script — which is, in fact, an augmented version of Arabo-Persian script — does not by default indicate short vowels, as is the case with its primogenitors. The doubling of a letter, such as the ‘r’ in the popular name Khurram, is not normally indicated either, the diacritic indicator being familiarly called tashdeed.
Likewise, those letters in a word that are not followed by a vowel — quiescent letters, that is — these, too, are left unmarked in normal writings. An example of this last case is the word amn [peace] in which there is no vowel after ‘m’ and so it is quiescent; but then, almost universally this word is becoming aman: yes, if the script has no vowels, it allows for such possibilities.
Note that all Semitic scripts, Hebrew and Syriac among them, share such peculiarities — they are all consonantal and they all move from right to left, and yet there is one exception, a telltale exception. This is the case of our common numerals, what are known as Arabic numerals, based as they are on a place-value system shared by the Latin/Roman script, moving from left to right. The appellation ‘Arabic’ numerals is a kind of misnomer, for these are Indian numerals, but since they reached the modern world through the Arabic writings of the 8th/9th century mathematician Al Khwarizmi, they were named so.
Now there are some intriguing consequences of all this. For example, a word in the Urdu script can be read in numerous ways, given that the three unspecified short vowels, zaer (the ‘i’ vowel), zabar (the ‘a’ vowel), and paesh (the ‘u’ vowel), can occur in different combinations; then, there can be that unmarked doubling of a letter as well as quiescent letters in it, too. It so happens that, quite often, many different readings of the same word in an expression all make equal lexical sense at once, leading to what one may call a semantic anarchy. So how does one cope with this anarchy?
It is very important to recognise that there are at least two ways of determining the correct reading. The first has to do with the context, the semantic environment is which the word occurs. One reads a word such that it makes plausible sense (qareena) in the general thrust of the expression. For example, the words aa‘lam [the created world] and aa‘lim [learned] are orthographically identical — but quite naturally one would opt for the latter vocalisation in a sentence such as ‘Zaid is erudite and informed; he is a great aa‘lim.’ But here two fascinating issues ought to be noted: one, that the moment of reading a text is also a moment of the interpretation of the text. So there is, in today’s parlance, an interactive relationship between the text and the reader. This is a mode of improvisation which we see in South Asian classical music too, where the moment of execution is also the moment of creation.
The other fascinating issue is that this interpretation can always be, in principle, challenged because this is a human judgemental act. Indeed, multiple readings of the same text have a whole history in the intellectual life of Arabic, Persian and Urdu. It is for this reason that the text of the Holy Quran is fully vocalised, with all diacritics given and all vowels specified, so that it is read in one and only one way; no other text has this privilege. The command of vowels in the script is so effective that the change of one single vowel can reverse the meaning. Thus, the word muntazir means ‘the one(s) who await(s)’; whereas muntazar reverses it, meaning ‘the awaited one(s).’ The first is an active participle, the second a passive one. Remember the well-known saying, literally, ‘my world became zaer and zabar’ — that is, ‘my world turned upside down, became messed up.’ Here is a pronouncement on the tyranny of vowels.
The second means of determining the correct reading of the text is recourse to poetry. Let’s pause here and carve it on our cultural consciousness that poetry — especially Urdu, Persian and Arabic poetry — is essential to learning a language, its sounds and its semantic range. Now we know that Urdu poetry is overwhelmingly, though not exclusively, built until this day around certain fundamental metres articulated for Arabic prosody by the mathematician Khalil ibn Ahmad as early as the 8th century. Khalil’s system has ramified into numerous modified metres that poets use as their ground, even when they play with them or subvert them, as is the case with modernist poets such as Noon Meem Rashid and Faiz Ahmed Faiz.
The historic point is that no poet who is considered a poet-proper would use a word destroying its standard vowels. If the reader omits a vowel when there is one, or adds a vowel when there is none, or does not double a sound when doubling is standard — this reader will destroy the metre of the poem. What does this mean? It means that the rhythm of a poem serves as the bridle to control the reading. How fascinating.
But there is one illegality that poetry does not control — placing a vowel when needed, but placing the wrong vowel. This is the offence often committed to Allama Muhammad Iqbal’s famous verse:
[O awaited Reality, manifest yourself in the cloak of metaphor!]
The fourth word here is muntazar, but, ah, it is often read as muntazir. And as I wrote in my last column, the same havoc is meted out to Faiz’s ahl-i-hikam — an expression almost ubiquitously misvocalised by readers. Poetry and therefore language is more than orthography.
Pride comes before a fall
By Anum Shaharyar
Certain stories, it seems, will never stop being adapted, either into other genres and settings, or on to various mediums. One such versatile tale is Jane Austen’s 1813 novel Pride and Prejudice. From a British miniseries to a Bollywood adaptation (Bride and Prejudice) and even an online vlog (The Lizzie Bennet Diaries), it has also crossed genres from the detective (Death Comes to Pemberly by P.D. James) to the undead (Pride and Prejudice and Zombies) and has been a popular base for modern novels (such as Helen Fielding’s Bridget Jones’s Diary).
Each adaptation has fluctuated wildly in how faithful it is to the original. That is a given, as adaptations can, as a matter of course, differ in what they retain of the original concept. However, while the latest offering in the line — Uzma Jalaluddin’s Ayesha At Last — is quite exciting as it puts a Muslim take on the story, in failing to retain much of Austen’s original plotline or charm, the book loses its allure.
The basic plot of Pride and Prejudice is a proud hero and a prejudiced heroine slowly unlearning lifelong habits and falling in love along the way. It makes for a captivating story. Unfortunately, the execution of this story in Jalaluddin’s novel is weak at best. The protagonist, Ayesha Shamsi, doesn’t have a gaggle of sisters or a mother obsessed with marriage or a Bingley moving in next door. There is, in fact, no character based on Bingley at all. What we do have is an Ayesha whose father died in suspicious circumstances back in India, prompting her widowed mother to move to suburban Toronto with her two children and her parents. Ayesha has a younger brother (nowhere present in the original), a set of grandparents (also missing in the original), and wears a hijab. That’s because Ayesha is Muslim — a refreshing twist which adds another point to the representation of Islamic stories.
But while it is very exciting that Muslim youngsters — who rarely see themselves represented as anything but a teenager about to be recruited for terrorism or, at best, a funny sidekick — can now see themselves as part of the main narrative, it is disappointing how weak the story itself is. Everything from the writing — middle-grade at best — and the characters — so very different from the original — to the plot itself, fail to impress. This might be the fault of the publishers who chose to market this book as a P&P retelling for young adult audiences. This creates false expectations; it would have made more sense had the novel been touted as a story about navigating this world as a regular girl who happens to be a hijabi.
Ayesha’s family includes a Shakespeare-quoting grandfather and cook-extraordinaire grandmother, a moody teenage brother and an overworked mother with a broken heart. Then there is the extended family, complete with flighty younger cousin Hafsa who receives multiple marriage proposals per week and for whom Ayesha is forced to act as the responsible, mature older cousin.
Because of a misunderstanding at the local mosque, Ayesha — who spends her days handling teenage students in her day job as a substitute teacher at the community school while simultaneously dreaming about being a poet — is forced to pretend to be Hafsa. As a consequence, she must now plan a conference with Khalid, the Mr Darcy to Ayesha’s Elizabeth Bennet.
Khalid — in a refreshing turn of events — is an actual practicing Muslim. It is important to get this point across because, even though the occurrence of Muslim characters has increased in recent years, it is still rare for those who practise the religion faithfully to be depicted as anything but evil, much less the actual hero of the story. The Muslim characters you do encounter in much of modern fiction are there as token representation, fine with drinking alcohol and never once mentioning prayers or actual Muslim holidays. This is why Khalid, who wears a thobe and a skullcap to his work as an e-commerce project manager, is such a welcome relief. Our handsome and conservative hero, who believes love comes after marriage, moves to Ayesha’s neighbourhood at the beginning of the story with his widowed mother — a scheming character completely new to the P&P narrative. However, Khalid’s sister, banished from the family to India for mysterious reasons, draws some parallels to Darcy’s sister Georgiana, and Wickham is introduced here as the charming rogue Tarek Khan, a slick conference organiser working with Ayesha and Khalid for the mosque.
A fun thing about reading an adaptation is identifying which parts of the new story were inspired by the original, or where the author linked the work to the source, and Jalaluddin does give quite a few nods to Austen. From the oft-quoted opening line “It is a truth universally acknowledged” to pivotal scenes such as the couple’s first, supremely awkward meeting or the horribly botched proposal, there are brief flashes of connection between this book and the text published in 1813. And since it is an ‘adaptation’, we already know most of what is going to happen. We know Tarek has his eye on Ayesha’s cousin Hafsa and that he is ultimately untrustworthy. We also know that even though there might be misunderstandings at first, our couple will eventually find their way to each other. I will concede that here, Jalaluddin does deliver on what she promises: Ayesha and Khalid, initially not willing to trust or like the other, find themselves taking comfort in each other’s presence and the various scheming characters — threatening to undo it all — ultimately lead our protagonists to fight their own pride and prejudices to find their ways back to each other.
There are several contemporary and cultural nods as well. Jalaluddin uses the story to talk about workplace Islamophobia, with Khalid facing a discriminatory boss and finding help in a supportive human resource manager. Ayesha’s lack of marriage prospects at the age of 27 gets a mention, pointing towards communities that value early marriages. Then there is the reference to political idealism and journalistic principles of fighting to report the truth, as Ayesha’s father died as a journalist fighting for worthy causes in India. Jalaluddin incorporates a number of issues into her story but, unfortunately, her deviations from the original plot, while relevant, don’t manage to retain the reader’s interest.
It is hard to feel invested, much less moved, by the plight of our protagonists — probably because, unlike Austen’s witty commentary on the times or the romantic comedy of manners she sketched, Jalaluddin doesn’t hold that same command over language. In the times in which we live, this story might be important, but here’s hoping there are multiple other adaptations as well, so that with increased representation of the modern Muslim, we also get better literature.
Ayesha At Last
By Uzma Jalaluddin
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